Lay Theories of Moral Progress.

Many consider the world to be morally better today than it was in the past and expect moral improvement to continue. How do people explain what drives this change? In this paper, we identify two ways people might think about how moral progress occurs: that it is driven by human action (i.e.

Building compressed causal models of the world.

A given causal system can be represented in a variety of ways. How do agents determine which variables to include in their causal representations, and at what level of granularity? Using techniques from Bayesian networks, information theory, and decision theory, we develop a formal theory according to which causal representations reflect a trade-off between compression and informativeness, where the optimal trade-off depends on the decision-theoretic value of information for a given agent in a given context. This theory predicts that, all else being equal, agents prefer causal models that are as compressed as possible.

Learning by thinking in natural and artificial minds.

Canonical cases of learning involve novel observations external to the mind, but learning can also occur through mental processes such as explaining to oneself, mental simulation, analogical comparison, and reasoning. Recent advances in artificial intelligence (AI) reveal that such learning is not restricted to human minds: artificial minds can also self-correct and arrive at new conclusions by engaging in processes of 'learning by thinking' (LbT). How can elements already in the mind generate new knowledge? This article aims to resolve this paradox, and in so doing highlights an important feature of natural and artificial minds - to navigate uncertain environments with variable goals, minds with limited resources must construct knowledge representations 'on demand'.

Allow Me to Explain: Benefits of Explaining Extend to Distal Academic Performance.

How does the act of explaining influence learning? Prior work has studied effects of explaining through a predominantly proximal lens, measuring short-term outcomes or manipulations within lab settings. Here, we ask whether the benefits of explaining extend to academic performance over time. Specifically, does the quality and frequency of student explanations predict students' later performance on standardized tests of math and English? In Study 1 (N = 127 5th-6th graders), participants completed a causal learning activity during which their explanation quality was evaluated.

Inside Ockham's razor: A mechanism driving preferences for simpler explanations.

People often prefer simpler explanations, defined as those that posit the presence of fewer causes (e.g., positing the presence of a single cause, Cause A, rather than two causes, Causes B and C, to explain observed effects).

Learning From Aggregated Opinion.

The capacity to leverage information from others' opinions is a hallmark of human cognition. Consequently, past research has investigated how we learn from others' testimony. Yet a distinct form of social information--increasingly guides our judgments and decisions.

Are ethical explanations explanatory? Meta-ethical beliefs shape judgments about explanations for social change.

Why were women given the right to vote? "Because it is morally wrong to deny women the right to vote." This explanation does not seem to fit the typical pattern for explaining an event: rather than citing a cause, it appeals to an ethical claim. Do people judge ethical claims to be genuinely explanatory? And if so, why? In Studies 1 (N = 220) and 2 (N = 293), we find that many participants accept ethical explanations for social change and that this is predicted by their meta-ethical beliefs in moral progress and moral principles, suggesting that these participants treat morality as a directional feature of the world, somewhat akin to a causal force.

Breaking down (and moving beyond) novelty as a trigger of curiosity.

The Novelty Seeking Model (NSM) places "novelty" at center stage in characterizing the mechanisms behind curiosity. We argue that the NSM's conception of novelty is too broad, obscuring distinct constructs. More critically, the NSM underemphasizes triggers of curiosity that better unify these constructs and that have received stronger empirical support: those that signal the potential for useful learning.

Tell me your (cognitive) budget, and I'll tell you what you value.

Consider the following two (hypothetical) generic causal claims: "Living in a neighborhood with many families with children increases purchases of bicycles" and "living in an affluent neighborhood with many families with children increases purchases of bicycles." These claims not only differ in what they suggest about how bicycle ownership is distributed across different neighborhoods (i.e.

Psychological freedom, rationality, and the naive theory of reasoning.

To make sense of the social world, people reason about others' mental states, including whether and in what ways others can form new mental states. We propose that people's judgments concerning the dynamics of mental state change invoke a "naive theory of reasoning." On this theory, people conceptualize reasoning as a rational, semi-autonomous process that individuals can leverage, but not override, to form new rational mental states.

Distinct Profiles for Beliefs About Religion Versus Science.

A growing body of research suggests that scientific and religious beliefs are often held and justified in different ways. In three studies with 707 participants, we examine the distinctive profiles of beliefs in these domains. In Study 1, we find that participants report evidence and explanatory considerations (making sense of things) as dominant reasons for beliefs across domains.

The moral consequences of teleological beliefs about the human species.

Adults in prior work often endorse explanations appealing to purposes (e.g., "pencils exist so people can write with them"), even when these "teleological" explanations are scientifically unwarranted (e.

Seeking evidence and explanation signals religious and scientific commitments.

Who is more committed to science: the person who learns about a scientific consensus and doesn't ask questions, or the person who learns about a scientific consensus and decides to pursue further inquiry? Who exhibits greater commitment to religious teachings: the person who accepts doctrine without question, or the person who seeks further evidence and explanations? Across three experiments (N = 801) we investigate the inferences drawn about an individual on the basis of their epistemic behavior - in particular, their decision to pursue or forgo further inquiry (evidence or explanation) about scientific or religious claims. We find that the decision to pursue further inquiry (about science or religion) is taken to signal greater commitment to science and to truth, as well as trustworthiness and good moral character (Studies 1-3). This is true even in the case of claims regarding controversial science topics, such as anthropogenic climate change (Study 3).

Philosophy instruction changes views on moral controversies by decreasing reliance on intuition.

What changes people's judgments on moral issues, such as the ethics of abortion or eating meat? On some views, moral judgments result from deliberation, such that reasons and reasoning should be primary drivers of moral change. On other views, moral judgments reflect intuition, with reasons offered as post-hoc rationalizations. We test predictions of these accounts by investigating whether exposure to a moral philosophy course (vs.

People recognize and condone their own morally motivated reasoning.

People often engage in biased reasoning, favoring some beliefs over others even when the result is a departure from impartial or evidence-based reasoning. Psychologists have long assumed that people are unaware of these biases and operate under an "illusion of objectivity." We identify an important domain of life in which people harbor little illusion about their biases - when they are biased for moral reasons.

The Puzzle of Belief.

The notion of belief appears frequently in cognitive science. Yet it has resisted definition of the sort that could clarify inquiry. How then might a cognitive science of belief proceed? Here we propose a form of pluralism about believing.

How "is" shapes "ought" for folk-biological concepts.

Knowing which features are frequent among a biological kind (e.g., that most zebras have stripes) shapes people's representations of what category members are like (e.

Minimally counterintuitive stimuli trigger greater curiosity than merely improbable stimuli.

Curiosity plays a key role in directing learning throughout the lifespan. Prior work finds that violations of expectations can be powerful triggers of curiosity in both children and adults, but it is unclear which expectation-violating events induce the greatest curiosity and how this might vary over development. Some theories have suggested a U-shaped function such that stimuli of moderate extremity pique the greatest curiosity.

Simplicity as a Cue to Probability: Multiple Roles for Simplicity in Evaluating Explanations.

People often face the challenge of evaluating competing explanations. One approach is to assess the explanations' relative probabilities-for example, applying Bayesian inference to compute their posterior probabilities. Another approach is to consider an explanation's qualities or "virtues," such as its relative simplicity (i.

If it's important, then I'm curious: Increasing perceived usefulness stimulates curiosity.

Curiosity is considered essential for learning and sustained engagement, yet stimulating curiosity in educational contexts remains a challenge. Can people's curiosity about a scientific topic be stimulated by providing evidence that knowledge about the topic has potential value to society? Here, we show that increasing perceptions of 'social usefulness' regarding a scientific topic also increases curiosity and subsequent information search. Our results also show that simply presenting interesting facts is not enough to influence curiosity, and that people are more likely to be curious about a scientific topic if they perceive it to be useful personally and socially.

Ask me why, don't tell me why: Asking children for explanations facilitates relational thinking.

Identifying abstract relations is essential for commonsense reasoning. Research suggests that even young children can infer relations such as "same" and "different," but often fail to apply these concepts. Might the process of explaining facilitate the recognition and application of relational concepts? Based on prior work suggesting that explanation can be a powerful tool to promote abstract reasoning, we predicted that children would be more likely to discover and use an abstract relational rule when they were prompted to explain observations instantiating that rule, compared to when they received demonstration alone.

Varieties of Ignorance: Mystery and the Unknown in Science and Religion.

How and why does the moon cause the tides? How and why does God answer prayers? For many, the answer to the former question is unknown; the answer to the latter question is a mystery. Across three studies testing a largely Christian sample within the United States (N = 2524), we investigate attitudes toward ignorance and inquiry as a window onto scientific versus religious belief. In Experiment 1, we find that science and religion are associated with different forms of ignorance: scientific ignorance is typically expressed as a personal unknown ("it's unknown to me"), whereas religious ignorance is expressed as a universal mystery ("it's a mystery"), with scientific unknowns additionally regarded as more viable and valuable targets for inquiry.

Deciding to be authentic: Intuition is favored over deliberation when authenticity matters.

Deliberative analysis enables us to weigh features, simulate futures, and arrive at good, tractable decisions. So why do we so often eschew deliberation, and instead rely on more intuitive, gut responses? We propose that intuition might be prescribed for some decisions because people's folk theory of decision-making accords a special role to authenticity, which is associated with intuitive choice. Five pre-registered experiments find evidence in favor of this claim.