Moral realism in nursing.

For more than 15 years Professor Per Nortvedt has been arguing the case for moral realism in nursing and the health-care context more generally. His arguments focus on the clinical contexts of nursing and medicine and are supplemented by a series of persuasive examples. Following a description of moral realism, and the kinds of considerations that support it, criticisms of it are developed that seem persuasive.

Safeguarding children in clinical research.

Current UK guidelines regarding clinical research on children permit research that is non-therapeutic from the perspective of that particular child. The guidelines permit research interventions that cause temporary pain, bruises or scars. It is argued here that such research conflicts with the Declaration of Helsinki according to which the interests of the research subject outweigh all other interests.

Is there a distinctive care ethics?

Is it true that an ethics of care offers something distinct from other approaches to ethical problems in nursing, especially principlism? In this article an attempt is made to clarify an ethics of care and then to argue that there need be no substantial difference between principlism and an ethics of care when the latter is considered in the context of nursing. The article begins by considering the question of how one could in fact differentiate moral theories. As is explained, this cannot be done merely in light of the moral judgements they defend, nor their ontological commitments (e.

Can supervising self-harm be part of ethical nursing practice?

It was reported in 2006 that a regime of 'supervised self harm' had been implemented at St George's Hospital, Stafford. This involves patients with a history of self-harming behaviour being offered both emotional and practical support to enable them to do so. This support can extend to the provision of knives or razors to enable them to self-harm while they are being supervised by a nurse.

Three versions of an ethics of care.

The ethics of care still appeals to many in spite of penetrating criticisms of it which have been presented over the past 15 years or so. This paper tries to offer an explanation for this, and then to critically engage with three versions of an ethics of care. The explanation consists firstly in the close affinities between nursing and care.

Clinical ethics committees: a practical response to ethical problems in clinical practice.

This article describes a recent development in the way in which ethical problems in clinical practice are being dealt with. The development of a network of Clinical Ethics Committees (CECs) across the UK is described, and the rationale for their emergence is explored. With the aid of a case example, two of the main methods available to CECs for analysis of cases referred to them are illustrated.

Why sports medicine is not medicine.

Sports Medicine as an apparent sub-class of medicine has developed apace over the past 30 years. Its recent trajectory has been evidenced by the emergence of specialist international research journals, standard texts, annual conferences, academic appointments and postgraduate courses. Although this field of enquiry and practice lays claim to the title 'sports medicine' this paper queries the legitimacy of that claim.

Disablement and personal identity.

A number of commentators claim their disability to be a part of their identity. This claim can be labelled 'the identity claim'. It is the claim that disabling characteristics of persons can be identity-constituting.

Nursing practice and the definition of human death.

This paper aims to highlight the gap in nursing literature of discussion of the definition of human death--to show that nurses should engage in such discussion. For the nursing role in the care of brain dead patients and their relatives may unwittingly promote and foster a definition of human death which is fundamentally flawed. A person can be warm, pink, have an independently beating heart and be breathing, yet still be diagnosed as brainstem dead.

Three concepts of suffering.

This paper has three main aims. The first is to provide a critical assessment of two rival concepts of suffering, that proposed by Cassell and that proposed in this journal by van Hooft. The second aim of the paper is to sketch a more plausible concept of suffering, one which derives from a Wittgensteinian view of linguistic meaning.