HAZMAT Technician-level Emergency Response: A Mental Model Framework for Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) Incidents.

This research examines the cognitive frameworks used by HAZMAT technicians when responding to incidents involving Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs), which are conventional explosive devices with radioactive materials incorporated. The objective is to introduce the Expected Mental Model State (EMMS) as a comprehensive evaluation tool for assessing and enhancing the expertise and situational awareness of emergency responders dealing with radiation crises. Through a series of expert focus group sessions using the well-established qualitative methodology of grounded theory, an Expected Mental Model State (EMMS) was developed.

Evaluation of Repurposing Archetypal Preventive Radiological/Nuclear Detectors for the Consequence Management Mission.

In the first hours or days after an unplanned release of radioactive material to the environment, the radiation detection instruments most widely available to local first responders may be those currently fielded for interdiction missions. This study investigated how such preventative radiological/nuclear detection instruments could perform if repurposed for consequence management missions. A representative sample of three archetypes (body-worn, human-carried, and other/large-detection-volume equipment) encompassed six categories: personal radiation detector, extended-range personal radiation detector, personal emergency radiation detector, radioisotope identification device, human-portable detector/backpack, and vehicle-mounted large-detection-volume detector.

How Prepared Are the Public and Responders for Nuclear Terrorism?

The theme of the 2017 Annual Meeting of the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements was "Assessment of National Efforts in Emergency Preparedness for Nuclear Terrorism: Is There a Need for Realignment to Close Remaining Gaps?" In the "Guidance, Training and Exercises: Emergency Responders" session, speakers explored our level of public and responder preparedness and the challenges to being adequately prepared. There were three themes expressed from the perspective of emergency responders. The federal government is effective at creating guidance and a systematic preparedness process but not so effective at engaging and implementing guidance and processes at the state and local level for technical hazards like radiation.

Updated Emergency Response Guidance for the First 48 h after the Outdoor Detonation of an Explosive Radiological Dispersal Device.

This paper updates portions of the guidance originally published in 2006 based on the interpretation of subsequent experiments simulating explosive aerosolization from a radiological dispersal device and three-dimensional modeling of a high-rise urban-canyon type environment and wind field. These new data increase confidence about the predicted range of radioactive ballistic fragments that could endanger first responders and the public. The results of the most recent complete set of experiments indicate that the previously recommended initial hazard boundary corresponding to the potential for acute health effects can be reduced from 500 m to 250 m.

Environmental measurements in an emergency: this is not a drill.

Emergency responders from the Department of Energy are trained regularly to assess the environmental consequences of a radiological or nuclear incident. While drills and exercises are highly effective tools in rehearsing for an emergency, the accidents at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plants presented real-world complexities that are difficult or impossible to simulate in such training. Customarily, the modeled hypothetical event used to create a drill or exercise data set is simple, well defined, and closely resembles conventional assumptions about the type of that event.

The ALARA principle in the context of a radiological or nuclear emergency.

Traditionally, the concept of As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) has been applied to the workplace and to protect the public. The goals are to minimize small incremental exposures on a daily basis or per specific task, and on a yearly basis, thereby to keep the total annual dose equivalent as far below regulatory limits as practical. In an extreme emergency caused by radiological or nuclear terrorism, or a large scale radiological accident, it is proposed that the same principles can be applied to protect First Responders against potentially large exposures.

Realistic radiological dispersal device hazard boundaries and ramifications for early consequence management decisions.

If dispersal occurs from an explosive radiological dispersal device, first responders need to know what actions they need to take to protect life and property. Many of the decisions required to minimize exposure will be made during the first hour. To help the first responder decide what countermeasures to employ, Sandia National Laboratories has established realistic hazard boundaries for acute and sub-acute effects relevant to radiological dispersal devices.

Emergency response guidance for the first 48 hours after the outdoor detonation of an explosive radiological dispersal device.

Strategies and decisions to protect emergency responders, the public, and critical infrastructure against the effects of a radiological dispersal device detonated outdoors must be made in the planning stage, not in the early period just after an attack. This contrasts with planning for small-scale types of radiological or nuclear emergencies, or for a large-scale nuclear-power-type accident that evolves over many hours or days before radioactivity is released to the environment, such that its effects can be prospectively modeled and analyzed. By the time it is known an attack has occurred, most likely there will have been casualties, all the radioactive material will have been released, plume growth will be progressing, and there will be no time left for evaluating possible countermeasures.