Steering them softly with a quality label? A case study analysis of a patient channelling strategy without financial incentives.

Steering patients to lower priced and/or higher quality providers can increase the value of a healthcare system. In a managed care setting, health insurers may use financial incentives for this purpose. However, introducing cost-sharing differences among providers may cause enrolee discontent, which may result in disenrollment.

Financing COVID-19-related health care costs in the Dutch competitive health system during 2020 and 2021: Overall experiences and policy recommendations for improving health system resilience.

The Dutch health system is based on the principles of managed (or regulated) competition, meaning that competing risk bearing insurers and providers negotiate contracts on the price, quantity and quality of care. The COVID-19 pandemic caused a huge external shock to the health system which potentially distorted the conditions required for fair competition. Therefore, an important question is to what extent was the competitive Dutch health system resilient to the financial shock caused by the pandemic? Overall, the Dutch competitive health system proved to be sufficiently flexible and resilient at absorbing the financial shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021 due to an effective combination of regulatory and self-regulatory measures.

Simulating the impact of centralization of prostate cancer surgery services on travel burden and equity in the English National Health Service: A national population based model for health service re-design.

Introduction: There is limited evidence on the impact of centralization of cancer treatment services on patient travel burden and access to treatment. Using prostate cancer surgery as an example, this national study analysis aims to simulate the effect of different centralization scenarios on the number of center closures, patient travel times, and equity in access.

Methods: We used patient-level data on all men (n = 19,256) undergoing radical prostatectomy in the English National Health Service between January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2014, and considered three scenarios for centralization of prostate cancer surgery services A: procedure volume, B: availability of specialized services, and C: optimization of capacity.

Patient responsiveness to a differential deductible: empirical results from The Netherlands.

Health insurers may use financial incentives to encourage their enrollees to choose preferred providers for medical treatment. Empirical evidence whether differences in cost-sharing rates across providers affects patient choice behavior is, especially from Europe, limited. This paper examines the effect of a differential deductible to steer patient provider choice in a Dutch regional market for varicose veins treatment.

Using the deductible for patient channeling: did preferred providers gain patient volume?

In market-based health care systems, channeling patients to designated preferred providers can increase payer's bargaining clout, other things being equal. In the unique setting of the new Dutch health care system with regulated competition, this paper evaluates the impact of a 1-year natural experiment with patient channeling on providers' market shares. In 2009 a large regional Dutch health insurer designated preferred providers for two different procedures (cataract surgery and varicose veins treatment) and gave its enrollees a positive financial incentive for choosing them.

Do patients choose hospitals with high quality ratings? Empirical evidence from the market for angioplasty in the Netherlands.

A necessary condition for competition to promote quality in hospital markets is that patients are sensitive to differences in hospital quality. In this paper we examine the relationship between hospital quality, as measured by publicly available quality ratings, and patient hospital choice for angioplasty using individual claims data from a large health insurer. We find that Dutch patients have a high propensity to choose hospitals with a good reputation, both overall and for cardiology, and a low readmission rate after treatment for heart failure.

Pharmaceutical policy in the Netherlands: from price regulation towards managed competition.

Purpose: To analyse the development of pharmaceutical policy in the Dutch market for outpatient prescription drugs since the early 1990s.

Methodology: A literature review and document analysis is performed to examine the effects of pharmaceutical policy on the performance of the Dutch market for outpatient prescription drugs since the early 1990s.

Findings: Government efforts to control prices of pharmaceuticals were effective in constraining prices of in-patent drugs, but had an opposite effect on the prices of generic drugs.

Assessing hospital competition when prices don't matter to patients: the use of time-elasticities.

Health care reforms in several European countries provide health insurers with incentives and tools to become prudent purchasers of health care. The potential success of this strategy crucially depends on insurers' bargaining leverage vis-à-vis health care providers. An important determinant of insurers' bargaining power is the willingness of consumers to consider alternative providers.

Why do patients bypass the nearest hospital? An empirical analysis for orthopaedic care and neurosurgery in the Netherlands.

Using data for 2003, we find that both for non-emergency orthopaedic care (38%) and neurosurgery (54%) numerous Dutch patients did not visit the nearest hospital. Our estimation results show that extra travel time negatively influences the probability of hospital bypassing. Good waiting time performance by the nearest hospital also significantly decreases the likelihood of a bypass decision.