Emergence and spread of SARS-CoV-2 variants from farmed mink to humans and back during the epidemic in Denmark, June-November 2020.

The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) not only caused the COVID-19 pandemic but also had a major impact on farmed mink production in several European countries. In Denmark, the entire population of farmed mink (over 15 million animals) was culled in late 2020. During the period of June to November 2020, mink on 290 farms (out of about 1100 in the country) were shown to be infected with SARS-CoV-2.

Simulation of Foot-and-Mouth Disease Spread and Effects of Mitigation Strategies to Support Veterinary Contingency Planning in Denmark.

To forge a path towards livestock disease emergency preparedness in Denmark, 15 different strategies to mitigate foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) were examined by modelling epidemics initiated in cattle, pig or small ruminant herds across various production systems located in four different Danish regions (Scenario 1), or in one specific livestock production system within each of the three species geographically distributed throughout Denmark (Scenario 2). When additional mitigation strategies were implemented on top of basic control strategies in the European foot-and-mouth disease spread model (EuFMDiS), no significant benefits were predicted in terms of the number of infected farms, the epidemic control duration, and the total economic cost. Further, the model results indicated that the choice of index herd, the resources for outbreak control, and the detection time of FMD significantly influenced the course of an epidemic.

Infection, recovery and re-infection of farmed mink with SARS-CoV-2.

Mink, on a farm with about 15,000 animals, became infected with SARS-CoV-2. Over 75% of tested animals were positive for SARS-CoV-2 RNA in throat swabs and 100% of tested animals were seropositive. The virus responsible had a deletion of nucleotides encoding residues H69 and V70 within the spike protein gene as well as the A22920T mutation, resulting in the Y453F substitution within this protein, seen previously in mink.

Preliminary report of an outbreak of SARS-CoV-2 in mink and mink farmers associated with community spread, Denmark, June to November 2020.

In June-November 2020, SARS-CoV-2-infected mink were detected in 290 of 1,147 Danish mink farms. In North Denmark Region, 30% (324/1,092) of people found connected to mink farms tested SARS-CoV-2-PCR-positive and approximately 27% (95% confidence interval (CI): 25-30) of SARS-CoV-2-strains from humans in the community were mink-associated. Measures proved insufficient to mitigate spread.

SARS-CoV-2 in Danish Mink Farms: Course of the Epidemic and a Descriptive Analysis of the Outbreaks in 2020.

SARS-CoV-2 infection is the cause of COVID-19 in humans. In April 2020, SARS-CoV-2 infection in farmed mink () occurred in the Netherlands. The first outbreaks in Denmark were detected in June 2020 in three farms.

Simulation of transmission and persistence of African swine fever in wild boar in Denmark.

African swine fever (ASF) is caused by ASF virus (ASFV) and is currently circulating in the eastern part of Europe posing a serious risk regarding transmission to western European countries. Wild boar is a main driver of the transmission and persistence of ASFV in the endemic infected countries in Europe. Some European countries free from ASF, such as Denmark and the Netherlands, have limited population sizes of wild boar, but have large swine productions.

Modeling the Effects of Duration and Size of the Control Zones on the Consequences of a Hypothetical African Swine Fever Epidemic in Denmark.

African swine fever (ASF) is a notifiable infectious disease. The disease is endemic in certain regions in Eastern Europe constituting a risk of ASF spread toward Western Europe. Therefore, as part of contingency planning, it is important to continuously explore strategies that can effectively control an epidemic of ASF.

Resource Estimations in Contingency Planning for Foot-and-Mouth Disease.

Preparedness planning for a veterinary crisis is important to be fast and effective in the eradication of disease. For countries with a large export of animals and animal products, each extra day in an epidemic will cost millions of Euros due to the closure of export markets. This is important for the Danish husbandry industry, especially the swine industry, which had an export of €4.

Control of African swine fever epidemics in industrialized swine populations.

African swine fever (ASF) is a notifiable infectious disease with a high impact on swine health. The disease is endemic in certain regions in the Baltic countries and has spread to Poland constituting a risk of ASF spread toward Western Europe. Therefore, as part of contingency planning, it is important to explore strategies that can effectively control an epidemic of ASF.

Simulating the epidemiological and economic effects of an African swine fever epidemic in industrialized swine populations.

African swine fever (ASF) is a notifiable infectious disease with a considerable impact on animal health and is currently one of the most important emerging diseases of domestic pigs. ASF was introduced into Georgia in 2007 and subsequently spread to the Russian Federation and several Eastern European countries. Consequently, there is a non-negligible risk of ASF spread towards Western Europe.

The costs of preventive activities for exotic contagious diseases-A Danish case study of foot and mouth disease and swine fever.

The present paper provides an overview of the costs of preventive activities, currently undertaken in Denmark, related to foot and mouth disease (FMD) and classical and African swine fever (SF). Only costs held between outbreaks were included. Costs were divided into public costs and costs paid by the pig and cattle industries, respectively.

Relationship of trade patterns of the Danish swine industry animal movements network to potential disease spread.

The movements of animals were analysed under the conceptual framework of graph theory in mathematics. The swine production related premises of Denmark were considered to constitute the nodes of a network and the links were the animal movements. In this framework, each farm will have a network of other premises to which it will be linked.

[The three types of influenza].

The unprecedented spread of the highly pathogenic avian influenza type A H5N1 is a threat to veterinary public health. However, the virus does not in its present form constitute a major threat to human public health. Only if the virus mutates to spread effectively from person to person will there be a risk of a new pandemic.

Risk factors for infection of sow herds with porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome (PRRS) virus.

In 1992, the porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSV) of European type (PRRSV-EU) was introduced in Denmark. By 1996, the virus had spread to approximately 25% of the Danish herds. In January 1996, a modified-live vaccine based on the American type of the virus (PRRSV-US) was used in replacement boars for Danish artificial insemination (AI) centres and from July 1996, the vaccine was used in PRRSV-EU infected herds for prevention of disease.