The Neural and Computational Architecture of Feedback Dynamics in Mouse Cortex during Stimulus Report.

Conscious reportability of visual input is associated with a bimodal neural response in the primary visual cortex (V1): an early-latency response coupled to stimulus features and a late-latency response coupled to stimulus report or detection. This late wave of activity, central to major theories of consciousness, is thought to be driven by the prefrontal cortex (PFC), responsible for "igniting" it. Here we analyzed two electrophysiological studies in mice performing different stimulus detection tasks and characterized neural activity profiles in three key cortical regions: V1, posterior parietal cortex (PPC), and PFC.

Pharmacological Elevation of Catecholamine Levels Improves Perceptual Decisions, But Not Metacognitive Insight.

Perceptual decisions are often accompanied by a feeling of decision confidence. Where the parietal cortex is known for its crucial role in shaping such perceptual decisions, metacognitive evaluations are thought to additionally rely on the (pre)frontal cortex. Because of this supposed neural differentiation between these processes, perceptual and metacognitive decisions may be divergently affected by changes in internal (e.

How (not) to demonstrate unconscious priming: Overcoming issues with post-hoc data selection, low power, and frequentist statistics.

One widely used scientific approach to studying consciousness involves contrasting conscious operations with unconscious ones. However, challenges in establishing the absence of conscious awareness have led to debates about the extent and existence of unconscious processes. We collected experimental data on unconscious semantic priming, manipulating prime presentation duration to highlight the critical role of the analysis approach in attributing priming effects to unconscious processing.

A disinhibitory circuit mechanism explains a general principle of peak performance during mid-level arousal.

Perceptual decision-making is highly dependent on the momentary arousal state of the brain, which fluctuates over time on a scale of hours, minutes, and even seconds. The textbook relationship between momentary arousal and task performance is captured by an inverted U-shape, as put forward in the Yerkes-Dodson law. This law suggests optimal performance at moderate levels of arousal and impaired performance at low or high arousal levels.

Catecholaminergic neuromodulation and selective attention jointly shape perceptual decision-making.

Perceptual decisions about sensory input are influenced by fluctuations in ongoing neural activity, most prominently driven by attention and neuromodulator systems. It is currently unknown if neuromodulator activity and attention differentially modulate perceptual decision-making and/or whether neuromodulatory systems in fact control attentional processes. To investigate the effects of two distinct neuromodulatory systems and spatial attention on perceptual decisions, we pharmacologically elevated cholinergic (through donepezil) and catecholaminergic (through atomoxetine) levels in humans performing a visuo-spatial attention task, while we measured electroencephalography (EEG).

Predictions and rewards affect decision-making but not subjective experience.

To survive, organisms constantly make decisions to avoid danger and maximize rewards in information-rich environments. As a result, decisions about sensory input are not only driven by sensory information but also by other factors, such as the expected rewards of a decision (known as the payoff matrix) or by information about temporal regularities in the environment (known as cognitive priors or predictions). However, it is unknown to what extent these different types of information affect subjective experience or whether they merely result in nonperceptual response criterion shifts.

Feedback information transfer in the human brain reflects bistable perception in the absence of report.

In the search for the neural basis of conscious experience, perception and the cognitive processes associated with reporting perception are typically confounded as neural activity is recorded while participants explicitly report what they experience. Here, we present a novel way to disentangle perception from report using eye movement analysis techniques based on convolutional neural networks and neurodynamical analyses based on information theory. We use a bistable visual stimulus that instantiates two well-known properties of conscious perception: integration and differentiation.

Illusory object recognition is either perceptual or cognitive in origin depending on decision confidence.

We occasionally misinterpret ambiguous sensory input or report a stimulus when none is presented. It is unknown whether such errors have a sensory origin and reflect true perceptual illusions, or whether they have a more cognitive origin (e.g.

Position representations of moving objects align with real-time position in the early visual response.

When interacting with the dynamic world, the brain receives outdated sensory information, due to the time required for neural transmission and processing. In motion perception, the brain may overcome these fundamental delays through predictively encoding the position of moving objects using information from their past trajectories. In the present study, we evaluated this proposition using multivariate analysis of high temporal resolution electroencephalographic data.

An academic survey on theoretical foundations, common assumptions and the current state of consciousness science.

We report the results of an academic survey into the theoretical and methodological foundations, common assumptions, and the current state of the field of consciousness research. The survey consisted of 22 questions and was distributed on two different occasions of the annual meeting of the Association of the Scientific Study of Consciousness (2018 and 2019). We examined responses from 166 consciousness researchers with different backgrounds (e.

Towards consensus on visual pursuit and visual fixation in patients with disorders of consciousness. A Delphi study.

Background: The aim of this Delphi study was to reach consensus about definition, operationalization and assessment of visual pursuit (VP) and visual fixation (VF).

Methods: In a three-round international Delphi study, clinical and research experts on disorders of consciousness indicated their level of agreement on 87 statements using a 5-point Likert scale. Consensus for agreement was defined by a median of 5, an interquartile range (IQR) ≤ 1, and ≥ 80% indicating moderate or strong agreement.

No Evidence for Neural Overlap between Unconsciously Processed and Imagined Stimuli.

Visual representations can be generated via feedforward or feedback processes. The extent to which these processes result in overlapping representations remains unclear. Previous work has shown that imagined stimuli elicit similar representations as perceived stimuli throughout the visual cortex.

Preserved sensory processing but hampered conflict detection when stimulus input is task-irrelevant.

Conflict detection in sensory input is central to adaptive human behavior. Perhaps unsurprisingly, past research has shown that conflict may even be detected in the absence of conflict awareness, suggesting that conflict detection is an automatic process that does not require attention. To test the possibility of conflict processing in the absence of attention, we manipulated task relevance and response overlap of potentially conflicting stimulus features across six behavioral tasks.

On the Necessity of Recurrent Processing during Object Recognition: It Depends on the Need for Scene Segmentation.

Although feedforward activity may suffice for recognizing objects in isolation, additional visual operations that aid object recognition might be needed for real-world scenes. One such additional operation is figure-ground segmentation, extracting the relevant features and locations of the target object while ignoring irrelevant features. In this study of 60 human participants (female and male), we show objects on backgrounds of increasing complexity to investigate whether recurrent computations are increasingly important for segmenting objects from more complex backgrounds.

The human visual system differentially represents subjectively and objectively invisible stimuli.

The study of unconscious processing requires a measure of conscious awareness. Awareness measures can be either subjective (based on participant's report) or objective (based on perceptual performance). The preferred awareness measure depends on the theoretical position about consciousness and may influence conclusions about the extent of unconscious processing and about the neural correlates of consciousness.

Pupil Dilation and the Slow Wave ERP Reflect Surprise about Choice Outcome Resulting from Intrinsic Variability in Decision Confidence.

Central to human and animal cognition is the ability to learn from feedback in order to optimize future rewards. Such a learning signal might be encoded and broadcasted by the brain's arousal systems, including the noradrenergic locus coeruleus. Pupil responses and the positive slow wave component of event-related potentials reflect rapid changes in the arousal level of the brain.

Representational dynamics preceding conscious access.

Our senses are continuously bombarded with more information than our brain can process up to the level of awareness. The present study aimed to enhance understanding on how attentional selection shapes conscious access under conditions of rapidly changing input. Using an attention task, EEG, and multivariate decoding of individual target- and distractor-defining features, we specifically examined dynamic changes in the representation of targets and distractors as a function of conscious access and the task-relevance (target or distractor) of the preceding item in the RSVP stream.

Subjective visibility report is facilitated by conscious predictions only.

Predictions in the visual domain have been shown to modulate conscious access. Yet, little is known about how predictions may do so and to what extent they need to be consciously implemented to be effective. To address this, we administered an attentional blink (AB) task in which target 1 (T1) identity predicted target 2 (T2) identity, while participants rated their perceptual awareness of validly versus invalidly predicted T2s (Experiment 1 & 2) or reported T2 identity (Experiment 3).

Criteria for empirical theories of consciousness should focus on the explanatory power of mechanisms, not on functional equivalence.

Doerig and colleagues put forward the notion that we need hard and theory-neutral criteria by which to arbitrate between empirical (mechanistic) theories of consciousness. However, most of the criteria that they propose are not theory neutral because they focus on functional equivalence between systems. Because empirical theories of consciousness are mechanistic rather than functionalist, we think these criteria are not helpful when arbitrating between them.

Decreased Alertness Reconfigures Cognitive Control Networks.

Humans' remarkable capacity to flexibly adapt their behavior based on rapid situational changes is termed cognitive control. Intuitively, cognitive control is thought to be affected by the state of alertness; for example, when drowsy, we feel less capable of adequately implementing effortful cognitive tasks. Although scientific investigations have focused on the effects of sleep deprivation and circadian time, little is known about how natural daily fluctuations in alertness in the regular awake state affect cognitive control.

Methylphenidate does not affect convergent and divergent creative processes in healthy adults.

An increasing number of healthy people use methylphenidate, a psychostimulant that increases dopamine and noradrenaline transmission in the brain, to help them focus over extended periods of time. While methylphenidate has been shown to facilitate some cognitive functions, like focus and distractor-resistance, the same drug might also contribute to cognitive impairment, for example, in creativity. In this study, we investigated whether acute administration of a low oral dose (20 mg) of methylphenidate affected convergent and divergent creative processes in a sample of young healthy participants.

Exploring the role of expectations and stimulus relevance on stimulus-specific neural representations and conscious report.

Subjective experience can be influenced by top-down factors, such as expectations and stimulus relevance. Recently, it has been shown that expectations can enhance the likelihood that a stimulus is consciously reported, but the neural mechanisms supporting this enhancement are still unclear. We manipulated stimulus expectations within the attentional blink (AB) paradigm using letters and combined visual psychophysics with magnetoencephalographic (MEG) recordings to investigate whether prior expectations may enhance conscious access by sharpening stimulus-specific neural representations.

No language unification without neural feedback: How awareness affects sentence processing.

How does the human brain combine a finite number of words to form an infinite variety of sentences? According to the Memory, Unification and Control (MUC) model, sentence processing requires long-range feedback from the left inferior frontal cortex (LIFC) to left posterior temporal cortex (LPTC). Single word processing however may only require feedforward propagation of semantic information from sensory regions to LPTC. Here we tested the claim that long-range feedback is required for sentence processing by reducing visual awareness of words using a masking technique.