Using exogenous organizational and regional hospital attributes to explain differences in case-mix adjusted hospital costs.

Diagnosis-related group (DRG) hospital reimbursement systems differentiate cases into cost-homogenous groups based on patient characteristics. However, exogenous organizational and regional factors can influence hospital costs beyond case-mix differences. Therefore, most countries using DRG systems incorporate adjustments for such factors into their reimbursement structure.

Identification and assessment of a comprehensive set of structural factors associated with hospital costs in Switzerland.

Structural factors can influence hospital costs beyond case-mix differences. However, accepted measures on how to distinguish hospitals with regard to cost-related organizational and regional differences are lacking in Switzerland. Therefore, the objective of this study was to identify and assess a comprehensive set of hospital attributes in relation to average case-mix adjusted costs of hospitals.

Domain-specific effects of physical activity on the demand for physician visits.

Objectives: To assess domain-specific effects of physical activity (PA) in the relationship with health care utilization and to investigate whether a measure that aggregates PA across domains (leisure, transport, work) is appropriate.

Methods: Data were retrieved from a longitudinal cohort study conducted in Southern Germany (women n = 1330, men n = 766). The number of physician visits was regressed on total PA and on PA differentiated by the domains leisure time, travel time and working time in a negative binomial model.

Buying efficiency: optimal hospital payment in the presence of double upcoding.

Background: With DRG payments, hospitals can game the system by 'upcoding' true patient's severity of illness. This paper takes into account that upcoding can be performed by the chief physician and hospital management, with the extent of the distortion depending on hospital's internal decision-making process. The internal decision making can be of the principal-agent type with the management as the principal and the chief physician as the agent, but the chief physicians may be able to engage in negotiations with management resulting in a bargaining solution.