Re-establishment of post-accident procedures for setting emergency dose limits based on the lessons learned in the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident.

In response to the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi atomic power plant in 2011, the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare issued an exemption ordinance to increase the dose limits for emergency workers temporarily from 100 mSv to 250 mSv from 14 March to 16 December 2011. However, there were many problems with setting and applying the dose limits as well as radiation protection. Based on the lessons learned, in 2015, the Government of Japan deliberated setting emergency radiation protection standards to ensure preparedness for future nuclear emergencies.

Tertiary evaluation of the committed effective dose of emergency workers that responded to the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident.

In January 2014, Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) learned that the committed effective dose (CED) for nine emergency workers at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident had been assessed by a method other than the standard assessment methods, established by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) in a secondary evaluation conducted in July 2013. The MHLW requested that the TEPCO and primary contractors review all CED data for 6,245 workers who engaged in emergency work in March and April 2011 except those previously reviewed in the 2013 secondary evaluation. This tertiary evaluation revealed that the recorded CED for 1,536 workers had more than 0.

Establishment of the central radiation dose registration system for decontamination work involving radioactive fallout emitted by the Fukushima Daiichi APP accident.

With respect to radiation protection for decontamination efforts involving radioactive fallout emitted by the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Atomic Power Plant, new regulations were established and obligated employers to monitor, record, and store of workers' dose records, and to check their past dose records at the time of employment. However, cumulative doses may not be properly maintained if a worker declares incorrect values for past doses. In response, with facilitation from the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, primary contractors of decontamination works decided to establish a central dose registration system.

A recommended epidemiological study design for examining the adverse health effects among emergency workers who experienced the TEPCO fukushima daiichi NPP accident in 2011.

Results from medical examinations conducted in 2012 of workers who were engaged in radiation work in 2012 as a result of the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) accident showed that the prevalence of abnormal findings was 4.21%, 3.23 points higher than the 0.

Fact-finding Survey in Response to the Manipulation of Personal Alarm Dosimeter Collection Efficiency: Lessons Learned About Post-Emergency Radiation Protection from the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi APP Accident.

During emergency work at TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Atomic Power Plant on December 1, 2011 a subcontractor demanded that its contracted workers cover their personal alarm dosimeters (PAD) with 3-cm-thick lead plates to lower dosimeter readings. As a response, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) conducted a fact-finding survey to identify similar cases and devise measures to prevent a recurrence of this incident. To screen the suspected cases, the MHLW extracted: a) cases in which a PAD reading was at least 15% higher than the reading obtained from a radio-photolumine-scence dosimeter (RPD), where the dose was greater than 5 mSv in a month (1813 data points), and b) dose data in which PAD readings were less than 50% of the expected dose, where exposure dose may exceed 1 mSv in a day (56 workers, 17,148 data points).

Governmental re-evaluation of the committed effective dose received by emergency workers at the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident.

In April 2013, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) noticed that significant discrepancies were present between the committed effective dose (CED) data for emergency workers at the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant provided by TEPCO and that reported by five primary contractors. The MHLW, based on re-evaluation of the data, provided administrative guidance which required TEPCO and the five primary contractors to readjust the CED data for 479 workers (2.5% of 19,346 emergency workers).

250 mSv: temporary increase in the emergency exposure dose limit in response to the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident and its decision making process.

The Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11, 2011, led to an accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant of the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO). In response to this accident, on March 14, 2011, the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare (MHLW) of Japan enforced an ordinance that temporarily increased the radiation exposure dose limit allowed to 250 mSv during the emergency. This article explains the processes of a) temporarily increasing emergency dose limits, b) controlling for the combined emergency and normal exposure doses, and c) reducing the limit back to 100 mSv.

New regulations for radiation protection for work involving radioactive fallout emitted by the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi APP accident--disposal of contaminated soil and wastes.

The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Atomic Power Plant that accompanied the Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11, 2011, released a large amount of radioactive material. To rehabilitate the contaminated areas, the government of Japan decided to carry out decontamination work and manage the waste resulting from decontamination. In the summer of 2013, the Ministry of the Environment planned to begin a full-scale process for waste disposal of contaminated soil and wastes removed as part of the decontamination work.

New regulations for radiation protection for work involving radioactive fallout emitted by the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi APP accident: application expansion to recovery and reconstruction work.

The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Atomic Power Plant that accompanied the Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11, 2011 released a large amount of radioactive material. To rehabilitate the contaminated areas, the government of Japan decided to carry out decontamination work. In April 2012, the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters (NERH) started dividing the restricted areas into three sub-areas based on the ambient dose rate.

Lessons learned: medical and health care management for emergency workers at the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi APP accident.

During the emergency work at the Fukushima Daiichi Atomic Power Plant (APP), the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) and the Japanese government experienced various problems in medical and health care management issues, including special medical examinations, on-site triage and initial treatment, patient transportation, lodging and food, and long-term health care for emergency workers. To resolve these problems, the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW) issued a series of compulsory directives and provided administrative guidance to TEPCO. Based on the experiences and lessons learned, the MHLW recognized that the proper management and implementation of medical and health care management in response to a similar accident would require sufficient measures and systematic preparation, including the following: 1.

Engineering case report.

During the emergency work at the Fukushima Daiichi Atomic Power Plant, Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) and the Japanese government experienced various problems in radiological exposure management for emergency workers. Radiological exposures resulted from the inappropriate use of respiratory protection, the improper use of protective garments, and insufficient worker training. Among the efforts to reduce external exposure, there were problems associated with the control of working hours, the effective use of a radiation shielding, and the lack of well-prepared work plans.

Lessons learned: Radiological protection for emergency workers at the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi APP (part 1).

During the emergency work at the Fukushima Daiichi Atomic Power Plant (APP), Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) and the Japanese government experienced various problems in radiological exposure management for emergency workers. To improve the implementation of appropriate radiological protection, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) issued a series of compulsory directives and provided administrative guidance to TEPCO. Based on the experiences and lessons learned, the MHLW recognized that to properly manage radiological exposure should a similar accident occur at another APP, sufficient measures and systematic preparation for radiological management should be ensured, including the following: a) Should an APP accident occur, assistance from the power company's corporate office or off-site support facilities outside the evacuation area is indispensable; b) Primary contractors must independently implement exposure management operations for the employees of their sub-contractors; c) APP operators should compile an operations manual, stockpile personal protective equipment, and personal alarm dosimeters (PADs) and prepare emergency systems and whole body counters (WBCs); and the labor standards authorities should compile an emergency operations manual.

Establishment of new regulations for radiological protection for decontamination work involving radioactive fallout emitted by the Fukushima Daiichi APP accident.

In response to the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Atomic Power Plant (APP) on March 11, 2011, the Japanese government decided to carry out decontamination projects around the plant. For the radiological protection of the decontamination workers, the Japanese government needed to establish new regulations because the existing regulation did not fit into "existing exposure situations" in which radioactive sources were scattered and spread in a wide area around the plant. The new regulations aim to set the appropriate protection standards in accordance with the risk of the ambient dose rate, radioactivity concentration, and type of radio nucleolus resulting from the APP accident, which is equivalent to or more than the typical protection required in planned situations.

Monitoring human exposures to upper-room germicidal ultraviolet irradiation.

After decades of neglect, the resurgence of tuberculosis in the United States between 1985 and 1992 renewed interest in the use of upper room ultraviolet germicidal irradiation to interrupt the transmission of airborne infections. More recently the bioterrorism threat and the appearance of new pathogens with the potential for airborne spread, such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), have stimulated installations of upper-room irradiation systems. The objective is to flood the entire volume of a room above 6.