Incomplete preferences and rational framing effects.

The normative principle of description invariance presupposes that rational preferences must be complete. The completeness axiom is normatively dubious, however, and its rejection opens the door to rational framing effects. In this commentary, we suggest that Bermúdez's insightful challenge to the standard normative view of framing can be clarified and extended by situating it within a broader critique of completeness.

Default sensitivity in attempts at social influence.

While past research has demonstrated the power of defaults to nudge decision makers toward desired outcomes, few studies have examined whether people understand how to strategically set defaults to influence others' choices. A recent paper (Zlatev et al. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 114, 13643-13648, 2017) found that participants exhibited "default neglect," or the failure to set optimal defaults at better than chance levels.

Towards a comparative science of emotion: Affect and consciousness in humans and animals.

The componential view of human emotion recognises that affective states comprise conscious, behavioural, physiological, neural and cognitive elements. Although many animals display bodily and behavioural changes consistent with the occurrence of affective states similar to those seen in humans, the question of whether and in which species these are accompanied by conscious experiences remains controversial. Finding scientifically valid methods for investigating markers for the subjective component of affect in both humans and animals is central to developing a comparative understanding of the processes and mechanisms of affect and its evolution and distribution across taxonomic groups, to our understanding of animal welfare, and to the development of animal models of affective disorders.

Gamble evaluation and evoked reference sets: Why adding a small loss to a gamble increases its attractiveness.

When presented with a gamble involving a chance of winning $9, participants rate it as only moderately attractive. However, when other participants are presented with a gamble that adds a chance of losing 5 cents - resulting in gamble that is strictly worse - they rate it as much more attractive. This surprising effect has previously been explained in terms of the small loss increasing the affective evaluability of $9.

Illusory inconsistencies in judgment: Stimulus-evoked reference sets and between-subjects designs.

Asked to judge the subjective size of numbers in a between-subjects design, participants rated 9 as larger than 221 (Birnbaum, 1999). The 9 > 221 effect seems to indicate that different stimuli evoke different contexts for comparison, and sounds a warning for the interpretation of between-subjects comparisons. We show that, contrary to appearances, the effect is not a result of stimulus-evoked reference sets.

When payoffs look like probabilities: Separating form and content in risky choice.

Paralleling research in perception, behavioral models of risky choice posit "psychophysical" transformations of material outcomes and probabilities. Prospect theory assumes a value function that is concave for gains and convex for losses, and an inverse S-shaped probability weighting function. But in typical experiments, form and content are confounded: Probabilities are represented on a bounded numerical scale, whereas representations of monetary gains (losses) are unbounded above (below).

What we (don't) know about what we know.

The hypothesis of unconscious influences on complex behavior is observationally equivalent to the dissociability of cognition and metacognition (reportability). The target article convincingly argues that evidence for unconscious influence is limited by the quality of the metacognitive measure used. However, it understates the empirical evidence for unconscious influences and overlooks considerations of cognitive architecture that make cognitive/metacognitive dissociations likely.

Options as information: rational reversals of evaluation and preference.

This article develops a rational analysis of an important class of apparent preference reversals-joint-separate reversals traditionally explained by the evaluability hypothesis. The "options-as-information" model considers a hypothetical rational actor with limited knowledge about the market distribution of a stimulus attribute. The actor's evaluations are formed via a 2-stage process-an inferential stage in which beliefs are updated on the basis of the sample of options received, followed by an assessment stage in which options are evaluated in light of these updated beliefs.

Information leakage from logically equivalent frames.

Framing effects are said to occur when equivalent frames lead to different choices. However, the equivalence in question has been incompletely conceptualized. In a new normative analysis of framing effects, we complete the conceptualization by introducing the notion of information equivalence.