Illusory inferences in conditional expressions.

A robber points a gun at a cashier and says: "Only one of these two options is true: If you conceal the combination to the safe, then I kill you; otherwise, if you don´t conceal the combination to the safe, then I kill you." Hearing this statement, most people conclude that, in either case, "I kill you." This is an illusory response, in fact; the valid conclusion states "I don´t kill you.

Auditory hindsight bias in school-age children.

We report two experiments investigating hindsight bias in children, focusing on a rarely studied age range of 8-13 years. In Experiment 1, we asked children to complete both an auditory hindsight task and a visual hindsight task. Children exhibited hindsight bias in both tasks, and the bias decreased with age.

Inferences from the negation of counterfactual and semifactual conditionals.

Our goal was to study how people understand the negation of counterfactuals (such as "Antonio denied/said that it is false that if Messi had played, then Barcelona would have won") and semifactuals (such as "Antonio denied that even if Messi had played, Barcelona would have won"). Previous studies have shown that participants negated basic conditionals using small-scope interpretations by endorsing a new conditional with the negated consequent, but also by making large-scope interpretations, endorsing a conjunction with the negated consequent. Three experiments showed that when participants were asked whether the negation of a counterfactual (Experiments 1 and 2) or semifactual (Experiment 3) conditional was followed by a new conditional, they made a small-scope interpretation, endorsing the same conditional with the negated consequent (e.

Signalling Three-Way Intersections: Is Redundancy Better Than Only Mandatory or Prohibitory Signs?

At intersections, drivers need to infer which ways are allowed by interpreting mandatory and/or prohibitory traffic signs. Time and accuracy in this decision-making process are crucial factors to avoid accidents. Previous studies show that integrating information from prohibitory signs is generally more difficult than from mandatory signs.

Conditional content, explicit information and generating cases: Sources for suppressing inferences.

In the present study, we evaluate the suppression effect by asking participants to make inferences with everyday conditionals ("if A, then B"; "if Ana finds a friend, then she will go to the theatre"), choosing between three possible conclusions ("she went to the theatre"; "she did not go to the theatre"; "it cannot be concluded"). We test how these inferences can be influenced by three factors: a) when the content of the conditional induces us to think about disabling conditions that prevent us from accepting the consequent (A and ¬B) or alternative conditions that induce us to think about other antecedents that could also lead to the consequent (¬A and B), b) when explicit information is given about what really happened (e.g.

How children and adults keep track of real information when thinking counterfactually.

Thinking about counterfactual conditionals such as "if she had not painted the sheet of paper, it would have been blank" requires us to consider what is conjectured (She did not paint and the sheet was blank) and what actually happened (She painted and the sheet was not blank). In two experiments with adults (Study 1) and schoolchildren from 7 to 13 years (Study 2), we tested three potential sources of difficulty with counterfactuals: inferring, distinguishing what is real vs conjectured (epistemic status) and comprehending linguistic conditional expressions ("if" vs "even if"). The results showed that neither adults nor schoolchildren had difficulty in the comprehension of counterfactual expressions such as "even if" with respect to "if then".

Testing the visual impedance effect in children with and without reading difficulties using a new visual reasoning task.

This study examined reasoning skills in children, specifically transitive reasoning and the visual impedance effect, with a new visual/pictorial task. The visual impedance effect is the effect produced by the possible interference in the reasoning process of irrelevant details elicited from the premises of a reasoning task. The new task had no reading requirements, which made it suitable for testing reasoning in primary school children, especially children with reading difficulties (RD), such as dyslexia.

Reasoning and Reading in Adults. A New Reasoning Task for Detecting the Visual Impendance Effect.

The visual impedance hypothesis states that at the time of reasoning, the reading context provokes visual images, which may add irrelevant details to an inference and thus could hamper reasoning. This study aims to create a new visual version of a reasoning task, similar to the traditional propositional task of relational syllogisms, but based on visuospatial components. Using such a task, it would be possible to investigate the deductive ability of relational inferences in tests without the need for reading.

Thinking about social and nonsocial alternative possibilities in premature preschoolers.

Introduction: Prematurely born preschoolers show developmental cognitive delay compared to full-term children. There are important neurological networks developing at preschool age related to perspective taking about the attribution of belief and to deduction with contrary-to-fact situations. Other deductive abilities may be completed during that period.

Concessive and semifactual interpretations during reasoning with multiple conditionals.

The present research evaluates how people integrate factual 'if then' and semifactual 'even if' conditional premises in an inference task. The theory of mental models establishes that semifactual statements are represented by two mental models with different epistemic status: 'A & B' is conjectured and 'not-A & B' is presupposed. However, following the principle of cognitive economy in tasks with a high working memory load such as reasoning with multiple conditionals, people could simplify the deduction process in two ways, by discarding: (a) the presupposed case and/or (b) the epistemic status information.

Inhibitory mechanism of the matching heuristic in syllogistic reasoning.

A number of heuristic-based hypotheses have been proposed to explain how people solve syllogisms with automatic processes. In particular, the matching heuristic employs the congruency of the quantifiers in a syllogism—by matching the quantifier of the conclusion with those of the two premises. When the heuristic leads to an invalid conclusion, successful solving of these conflict problems requires the inhibition of automatic heuristic processing.

Perceptual inferences about indeterminate arrangements of figures.

Previous studies in spatial propositional reasoning showed that adults use a particular strategy for making representations and inferences from indeterminate descriptions (those consistent with different alternatives). They do not initially represent all the alternatives, but construct a unified mental representation that includes a kind of mental footnote. Only when the task requires access to alternatives is the unified representation re-inspected.

The influence of differences in the functioning of the neurocognitive attentional networks on drivers' performance.

Considerable research efforts are currently being devoted to analysing the role that the attentional system plays in determining driving behaviour, with the ultimate objective of reducing the number of attention-related accidents. The present study aims to assess the influence of differences in the functioning of the three attentional networks (executive control, attentional orienting and alerting) when drivers have to deal with some common hazardous situations, for example, when an oncoming car or a pedestrian unexpectedly crosses their trajectory. Multiple measures of participants' attentional functioning were obtained from a computer-based neurocognitive test: the Attention Networks Test for Interactions and Vigilance (ANTI-V).

The semantics of 'unless' conditionals: evidence from 'unless' and disjunctive inferences.

We report the results of an experiment investigating conditional inferences from conditional assertions such as 'Juan won't go to León unless Nuria goes to Madrid' and 'Either Nuria goes to Madrid or Juan won't go to León'. This experiment addresses Dancygier's claims about the semantics of 'unless' by examining inferential endorsements of 'not-A unless B' and 'Either B or not-A' in the canonical order, presenting the categorical premise after the conditional assertions, and in the inverse order, presenting the categorical premise before the conditional assertions. The results of the experiment confirm that the representation of 'unless' includes two possibilities, although as Dancygier holds one of the possibilities may not be complete.

Cost of mental set reconfiguration between digits and their photisms in synaesthesia.

In this study we present an experiment investigating the reconfiguration process elicited by the task switching paradigm in synaesthesia. We study the time course of the operations involved in the activation of photisms. In the experimental Group, four digit-color synaesthetes alternated between an odd-even task and a color task (to indicate the photism elicited by each digit).

A driving-emulation task to study the integration of goals with obligatory and prohibitory traffic signs.

This research aims to analyse how drivers integrate the information provided by traffic signs with their general goals (i.e. where they want to go).

Encoding time and signs exposure time in the representation of diagrammatic deontic meanings.

It has been proposed that prohibition and obligation be represented in different ways in reasoning with deontic information (Bucciarelli & Johnson-Laird, 2005). Obligations are salient in permissible situations and prohibitions in impermissible situations. In some specific cases, differential initial representations are also consistently predicted from the comprehension of negations, if prohibition is considered as the negation of an obligation.

Unless reasoning.

We report the results of two experiments investigating conditional inferences from conditional unless assertions, such as Juan is not in León unless Nuria is in Madrid. Experiments 1 and 2 check Fillenbaum's hypothesis about the semantic similarity of unless with if not and only if assertions; both also examine inferential endorsements (Experiment 1) and endorsements and latencies (Experiment 2) of the four logically equivalent conditional formulations: if A then B, if not-B then not-A, A only if B and notA unless B. The results of these experiments show the similarity of unless and only if confirming that the representation of both conditionals from the outset probably include two possibilities directionally oriented from B to A; results also confirm the especial difficulty of unless assertions.

Mental representations of obligatory and prohibitory traffic signs.

Every traffic sign conveys a single proposition about traffic conditions. Drivers must integrate this proposition with their goals and other known facts to decide on an appropriate action in what amounts to a deduction task. For example, imagine that you are driving a car and you want to turn right at an intersection but there is a 'no right turn' sign.

Inferences from semifactual 'even if' conditionals.

We report three experiments on semifactual conditionals such as 'even if he had worn his seatbelt he would have been injured'. Semifactuals contain a counterfactual antecedent (the presupposed fact is, he did not wear a seatbelt) and a true consequent (the fact is, he was injured). The experiments show that from the denial of the antecedent, 'he did not wear his seatbelt', reasoners do not infer the standard conclusion 'he was not injured' but instead they infer the asymmetric conclusion, 'he was injured'.

Priming in deduction: a spatial arrangement task.

The mental model theory assumes that people reason by manipulating mental representations of states of the word, called "mental models." In the present study we used a new deduction task based on diagrammatic premises. We show that a premise can prime other premises that induce similar mental models in a way analogous to the case of words with related meanings, which prime one another.