Effect of shape anisotropy on percolation of aligned and overlapping objects on lattices.

We investigate the percolation transition of aligned, overlapping, anisotropic shapes on lattices. Using the recently proposed lattice version of excluded volume theory, we show that shape-anisotropy leads to some intriguing consequences regarding the percolation behavior of anisotropic shapes. We consider a prototypical anisotropic shape-rectangle-on a square lattice and show that, for rectangles of width unity (sticks), the percolation threshold is a monotonically decreasing function of the stick length, whereas, for rectangles of width greater than two, it is a monotonically increasing function.

Epidemic prevalence information on social networks can mediate emergent collective outcomes in voluntary vaccine schemes.

The effectiveness of a mass vaccination program can engender its own undoing if individuals choose to not get vaccinated believing that they are already protected by herd immunity. This would appear to be the optimal decision for an individual, based on a strategic appraisal of her costs and benefits, even though she would be vulnerable during subsequent outbreaks if the majority of the population argues in this manner. We investigate how voluntary vaccination can nevertheless emerge in a social network of rational agents, who make informed decisions whether to be vaccinated, integrated with a model of epidemic dynamics.

When big data fails: Adaptive agents using coarse-grained information have competitive advantage.

The recent trend for acquiring big data assumes that possessing quantitatively more and qualitatively finer data necessarily provides an advantage that may be critical in competitive situations. Using a model complex adaptive system where agents compete for a limited resource using information coarse grained to different levels, we show that agents having access to more and better data perform worse than others in certain situations. The relation between information asymmetry and individual payoffs is seen to be complex, depending on the composition of the population of competing agents.

Co-action provides rational basis for the evolutionary success of Pavlovian strategies.

Strategies incorporating direct reciprocity, e.g., Tit-for-Tat and Pavlov, have been shown to be successful for playing the Iterated Prisoners Dilemma (IPD), a paradigmatic problem for studying the evolution of cooperation among non-kin individuals.

Symmetry warrants rational cooperation by co-action in Social Dilemmas.

Is it rational for selfish individuals to cooperate? The conventional answer based on analysis of games such as the Prisoners Dilemma (PD) is that it is not, even though mutual cooperation results in a better outcome for all. This incompatibility between individual rationality and collective benefit lies at the heart of questions about the evolution of cooperation, as illustrated by PD and similar games. Here, we argue that this apparent incompatibility is due to an inconsistency in the standard Nash framework for analyzing non-cooperative games and propose a new paradigm, that of the co-action equilibrium.

Continuum percolation of overlapping disks with a distribution of radii having a power-law tail.

We study the continuum percolation problem of overlapping disks with a distribution of radii having a power-law tail; the probability that a given disk has a radius between R and R+dR is proportional to R(-(a+1)), where a>2. We show that in the low-density nonpercolating phase, the two-point function shows a power-law decay with distance, even at arbitrarily low densities of the disks, unlike the exponential decay in the usual percolation problem. As in the problem of fluids with long-range interaction, we argue that in our problem, the critical exponents take their short-range values for a>3-η(sr) whereas they depend on a for a<3-η(sr) where η(sr) is the anomalous dimension for the usual percolation problem.