Promoting racial equity in COVID-19 resource allocation.

Due to COVID-19's strain on health systems across the globe, triage protocols determine how to allocate scarce medical resources with the worthy goal of maximising the number of lives saved. However, due to racial biases and long-standing health inequities, the common method of ranking patients based on impersonal numeric representations of their morbidity is associated with disproportionately pronounced racial disparities. In response, policymakers have issued statements of solidarity.

The Compromising Interpretive Model as a Harm Reduction Strategy for Families that Have Chosen High School Football.

In a reply to Ross, I argue that, as head injuries often lack external indicators, it is imperative that youth-patient-athletes themselves be convinced to report these injuries. Parents, although part of the pediatric triad, will be no help if the adolescent chooses to conceal the information from them as well. Further, I explain why a more deliberate focus on the role of parents in this relationship does not alter my support of the compromising interpretive model as a harm reduction strategy.

Helping Children Hurt Themselves: Why Pediatricians Ought to Support Adolescent Football Players in Their Athletic Goals.

Participation in sports such as football puts youth-athletes at high risk of injury. Helmets cannot protect players from the possibility of traumatic brain injury, and repeated concussive injuries can lead to chronic traumatic encephalopathy later in life. In light of such facts, the morally appropriate role of physicians who treat patient-athletes comes into question.

Valuing lives and allocating resources: a defense of the modified youngest first principle of scarce resource distribution.

In this paper, I argue that the 'modified youngest first' principle provides a morally appropriate criterion for making decisions regarding the distribution of scarce medical resources, and that it is morally preferable to the simple 'youngest first' principle. Based on the complete lives system's goal of maximizing complete lives rather than individual life episodes, I argue that essential to the value we see in complete lives is the first person value attributed by the experiencer of that life. For a life to be 'complete' or 'incomplete,' the subject of that life must be able to understand the concept of a complete life, to have started goals and projects, and to know what it would be for that life to be complete.