Eradication of a large outbreak of a single strain of vanB vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus faecium at a major Australian teaching hospital.

Objective: To demonstrate that nosocomial transmission of vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE) can be terminated and endemicity prevented despite widespread dissemination of an epidemic strain in a large tertiary-care referral hospital.

Interventions: Two months after the index case was detected in the intensive care unit, 68 patients became either infected or colonized with an epidemic strain of vanB vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus faecium despite standard infection control procedures. The following additional interventions were then introduced to control the outbreak: (1) formation of a VRE executive group; (2) rapid laboratory identification (30 to 48 hours) using culture and polymerase chain reaction detection of vanA and vanB resistance genes; (3) mass screening of all hospitalized patients with isolation of carriers and cohorting of contacts; (4) environmental screening and increased cleaning; (5) electronic flagging of medical records of contacts; and (6) antibiotic restrictions (third-generation cephalosporins and vancomycin).

Screening and electronic labelling of ward contacts of vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus faecium vanB carriers during a single-strain hospital outbreak and after discharge from hospital.

A large single-strain outbreak of vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus faecium (VREF) vanB occurred in Royal Perth Hospital from July to December 2001. When a VREF-carrying patient was discovered on a ward, all patients on the ward were screened with rectal swabs. A total of 172 patients were colonised, four with infections, but no deaths were attributable to VREF.

A review of the Royal Perth Hospital Bali experience: an infection control perspective.

Thirty five patients were transferred to Royal Perth Hospital (RPH) after the Bali bombings. The patients had severe burn injuries and were considered to be at high-risk of both the carriage and acquisition of multi-resistant organisms (MROs). Whilst seeking to protect the Bali patients with a comprehensive infection control response, we also sought to protect other high-risk patients from nosocomial acquisition of MROs.