Assignment constraints in shared transportation services.

Competitive markets, increased fuel costs, and underutilized vehicle fleets are characteristics that currently define the logistics sector. Given an increasing pressure to act in a manner that is economically and ecologically efficient, mechanisms that help to benefit from idle capacities are on the rise. In the Sharing Economy, collaborative usage is typically organized through platforms that facilitate the exchange of goods or services.

The optimal lockdown intensity for COVID-19.

One of the principal ways nations are responding to the COVID-19 pandemic is by locking down portions of their economies to reduce infectious spread. This is expensive in terms of lost jobs, lost economic productivity, and lost freedoms. So it is of interest to ask: What is the optimal intensity with which to lockdown, and how should that intensity vary dynamically over the course of an epidemic? This paper explores such questions with an optimal control model that recognizes the particular risks when infection rates surge beyond the healthcare system's capacity to deliver appropriate care.

How long should the COVID-19 lockdown continue?

Nations struggled to decide when and how to end COVID-19 inspired lockdowns, with sharply divergent views between those arguing for a resumption of economic activity and those arguing for continuing the lockdown in some form. We examine the choice between continuing or ending a full lockdown within a simple optimal control model that encompasses both health and economic outcomes, and pays particular attention to when need for care exceeds hospital capacity. The model shows that very different strategies can perform similarly well and even both be optimal for the same relative valuation on work and life because of the presence of a so-called Skiba threshold.

The collaborative multi-level lot-sizing problem with cost synergies.

Collaborative operations planning is a key element of modern supply chains. We introduce the collaborative multi-level lot-sizing problem with cost synergies. This arises if producers can realise reductions of their costs by providing more than one product in a specific time horizon.

The cost of incentive compatibility in auction-based mechanisms for carrier collaboration.

Collaboration has been one of the important trends in vehicle routing. A typical mechanism to enable carrier collaboration is to use combinatorial auctions, where requests are not traded individually but are combined into bundles. Previous literature on carrier collaboration has focused on issues such as bundle formation or winner determination, typically assuming truthfulness of all agents and absence of any strategic behavior.

Exact solutions for the collaborative pickup and delivery problem.

In this study we investigate the decision problem of a central authority in pickup and delivery carrier collaborations. Customer requests are to be redistributed among participants, such that the total cost is minimized. We formulate the problem as multi-depot traveling salesman problem with pickups and deliveries.

The two-region multi-depot pickup and delivery problem.

Logistics networks are constantly evolving such that new and more varied structures arise and need to be studied. Carriers are aiming for opportunities to save costs by efficient planning. Motivated by this, we define the two-region multi-depot pickup and delivery problem.

Centralized bundle generation in auction-based collaborative transportation.

In horizontal collaborations, carriers form coalitions in order to perform parts of their logistics operations jointly. By exchanging transportation requests among each other, they can operate more efficiently and in a more sustainable way. This exchange of requests can be organized through combinatorial auctions, where collaborators submit requests for exchange to a common pool.

Leading bureaucracies to the tipping point: An alternative model of multiple stable equilibrium levels of corruption.

We present a novel model of corruption dynamics in the form of a nonlinear optimal dynamic control problem. It has a tipping point, but one whose origins and character are distinct from that in the classic Schelling (1978) model. The decision maker choosing a level of corruption is the chief or some other kind of authority figure who presides over a bureaucracy whose state of corruption is influenced by the authority figure's actions, and whose state in turn influences the pay-off for the authority figure.

Numerical solution of a conspicuous consumption model with constant control delay.

We derive optimal pricing strategies for conspicuous consumption products in periods of recession. To that end, we formulate and investigate a two-stage economic optimal control problem that takes uncertainty of the recession period length and delay effects of the pricing strategy into account.This non-standard optimal control problem is difficult to solve analytically, and solutions depend on the variable model parameters.