Toddlers' expressions indicate that they track agent-object interactions but do not detect false object representations.

In the theory of mind debate, a middle position between nativism and conceptual change theory has gained traction. This position states that children younger than 4 years track agent-object relations (by building "records" of others' experiences) without cognizing how agents represent-or misrepresent-the objects they encounter. We tested these claims with 3.

No signs of automatic perspective-taking or its modulation by joint attention in toddlers using an object retrieval task.

It is currently debated whether simple forms of social perspective-taking that are in place by late infancy are performed automatically. We conducted two experiments ( = 124) to test whether 3-year-olds show automatic perspective-taking during object searches, and whether automatic perspective-taking is facilitated by joint attention. Children were asked to retrieve an object immediately after it was moved from one (L1) to another (L2) location within a container, e.

Sharing Experiences in Infancy: From Primary Intersubjectivity to Shared Intentionality.

We contrast two theses that make different assumptions about the developmental onset of human-unique sociality. The primary intersubjectivity thesis (PIT) argues that humans relate to each other in distinct ways from the beginning of life, as is shown by newborns' participation in face-to-face encounters or "primary intersubjectivity." According to this thesis, humans' innate relational capacity is the seedbed from which all subsequent social-emotional and social-cognitive developments continuously emerge.