The impact of the Oakland SSB tax on prices and volume sold: A study of intended and unintended consequences.

We examine the effects of a sugar-sweetened beverage (SSB) tax that took effect in Oakland, California in 2017. Using rich customized universal product code -level data, we estimate the effect of the SSB tax on prices and volume in the short to medium term in a difference-in-differences framework. We pay particular attention to tax-avoidance strategies that may minimize the policy's intended effect including: (i) transfers to SSBs to the nontaxed border area (i.

The Impact of a Sweetened Beverage Tax on Beverage Volume Sold in Cook County, Illinois, and Its Border Area.

Background: Sugar-sweetened beverage (SSB) consumption is linked to adverse health outcomes.

Objective: To evaluate the impact of the 2017 Cook County, Illinois, Sweetened Beverage Tax (SBT) on the volume of taxed and untaxed beverages sold in Cook County and its 2-mile border area.

Design: Pre-post intervention-comparison site difference-in-differences study.

The impact of the Cook County, IL, Sweetened Beverage Tax on beverage prices.

This study assessed the extent to which the Cook County, IL, Sweetened Beverage Tax (SBT) of one cent per ounce (oz) on sugar-sweetened and artificially sweetened beverages was passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices. We drew on universal product code-level store scanner data and used a pre-post intervention-comparison site difference-in-differences (DID) study design to estimate the impact of the Cook County SBT on prices of taxed beverages, across product categories and sizes, as well as on prices of untaxed beverages. The DID model results showed an over-shifting of the tax with a 119% pass-through rate, on average, across all taxed beverages in Cook County compared to its comparison site.

Payment mechanism and GP self-selection: capitation versus fee for service.

This paper analyzes the consequences of allowing gatekeeping general practitioners (GPs) to select their payment mechanism. We model GPs' behavior under the most common payment schemes (capitation and fee for service) and when GPs can select one among them. Our analysis considers GP heterogeneity in terms of both ability and concern for their patients' health.

Treatment and referral decisions under different physician payment mechanisms.

This paper analyzes and compares the incentive properties of some common payment mechanisms for GPs, namely fee for service (FFS), capitation and fundholding. It focuses on gatekeeping GPs and it specifically recognizes GPs heterogeneity in both ability and altruism. It also allows inappropriate care by GPs to lead to more serious illnesses.

Estimating differences between male and female physician service provision using panel data.

Using panel data, we estimate the impact of an increasing share of female physicians on the total output of Canadian physicians. A micro-econometric model is developed specifically for the Canadian context and estimated using administrative data on all Canadian physicians paid on a fee-for-service basis from 1989 to 1998. Our results suggest that female physicians systematically provide fewer services than their male counterparts for almost all specialties and provinces studied.

The cost of schizophrenia: lessons from an international comparison.

Background: A number of studies have attempted to estimate the aggregate burden of mental illness in particular countries. It has been observed that the economic costs vary by country. This is particularly true for estimates of the cost of schizophrenia, a severe mental illness that can lead to major psychiatric disability.

Information asymmetry, insurance, and the decision to hospitalize.

We analyze the problem of second-best optimal health insurance in the context of a model in which patients and doctors must decide not only on an aggregate quantity of health services to use in treating various kinds of illness, but also have a choice between different kinds of providers (in particular, outpatient services rendered by primary-care physicians or inpatient services provided by hospital-based specialists). We consider well-informed patients' choices of provider when they have conventional insurance so they only pay part of the cost of their health services, as well as the equilibrium strategies of doctors and patients when there is patient-provider asymmetry; in the latter case we also analyze a managed-care insurance setup under which doctors are paid by capitation. We find that under certain plausible conditions, second-best optimal managed-care plans with supply-side incentives dominate second-best optimal conventional plans that rely on cost control through demand-side cost sharing.

Determinants of physicians' decisions to specialize.

In this paper, we study physician specialty decisions using several unique data sets which include information on almost all Canadian physicians who practised in Canada between 1989 and 1998. Unlike previous studies, we use a truly exogenous measure of potential income across general and specialty medicine to estimate the effect of income on physicians' specialty choices. Furthermore, our estimation procedure allows us to purge the income-effect estimates of non-pecuniary specialty attributes which may be correlated with higher paying specialties.