Implementing a mental health app library in primary care: A feasibility study.

Confronted with a wide range of digital health tools (DHT), professionals and patients need guidance to use these tools correctly and optimize health management. In the fall of 2020, a DHT library developed by Quebec-based company TherAppX was implemented in 22 institutions. The library was designed to enable healthcare professionals to use DHT in clinical care.

Evidence of User-Expert Gaps in Health App Ratings and Implications for Practice.

Searching the commercial Google Play Store and App Store is one of the most common strategies for discovering mobile applications for digital health, both among consumers and healthcare professionals. However, several studies have suggested a possible mismatch between this strategy and the objective of finding apps in physical and mental health that are both clinically relevant and reliable from a privacy standpoint. This study provides direct evidence of a gap between the five-star user rating system and expert ratings from a curated library of over 1,200 apps that cover both physical and mental health.

Reasoning outside the box: Divergent thinking is related to logical reasoning.

When people reason, they do so in a way that suggests they are thinking beyond the premises and actively using background knowledge. This study explored the hypothesis that divergent thinking, a key component of creativity, is a unique predictive factor of logical reasoning. A total of 96 adults completed a divergent thinking task and logical reasoning problems with varying forms and contents.

Reasoning strategies predict use of very fast logical reasoning.

The dual strategy model proposes that people use one of two potential ways of processing information when making inferences. The statistical strategy generates a rapid probabilistic estimate based on associative access to a wide array of information, while the counterexample strategy uses a more focused representation, allowing for a search for potential counterexamples. In the following studies, we explore the hypothesis that individual differences in strategy use are related to the ability to make rapid intuitive logical judgments.

Divergent Thinking Promotes Deductive Reasoning in Preschoolers.

This study explored the hypothesis that preschoolers' deductive reasoning would be improved by encouraging use of divergent thinking (DT). Children of 4-5 years of age (n = 120) were randomly given DT or neutral control exercises before deductive reasoning problems. To allow a stronger test of the hypothesis, half of the children receiving the DT exercises were given explicit examples, which have been shown to reduce ideational originality.

The development of fast and slow inferential responding: Evidence for a parallel development of rule-based and belief-based intuitions.

Dual process theories postulate the existence of two levels of processing, Type 1, which uses belief-based cues to make very rapid inferences, and Type 2, which uses more conscious, working memory-based processes that are, in principle, capable of making rule-based judgments. There is a common assumption that Type 1 processes are more rapidly produced, while Type 2 processes take more time. Evidence for this assumption is mixed.

Interactions between inferential strategies and belief bias.

The dual strategy model of reasoning proposed by Verschueren, Schaeken, and d'Ydewalle (Thinking & Reasoning, 11(3), 239-278, 2005a; Memory & Cognition, 33(1), 107-119, 2005b) suggests that people can use either a statistical or a counterexample-based strategy to make deductive inferences. Subsequent studies have supported this distinction and investigated some properties of the two strategies. In the following, we examine the further hypothesis that reasoners using statistical strategies should be more vulnerable to the effects of conclusion belief.

The capacity to generate alternative ideas is more important than inhibition for logical reasoning in preschool-age children.

There is little consensus about the nature of logical reasoning and, equally important, about how it develops. To address this, we looked at the early origins of deductive reasoning in preschool children. We examined the contribution of two factors to the reasoning ability of very young children: inhibitory capacity and the capacity to generate alternative ideas.

Logical reasoning versus information processing in the dual-strategy model of reasoning.

One of the major debates concerning the nature of inferential reasoning is between counterexample-based strategies such as mental model theory and statistical strategies underlying probabilistic models. The dual-strategy model, proposed by Verschueren, Schaeken, & d'Ydewalle (2005a, 2005b), which suggests that people might have access to both kinds of strategy has been supported by several recent studies. These have shown that statistical reasoners make inferences based on using information about premises in order to generate a likelihood estimate of conclusion probability.

How do pre-adolescent children interpret conditionals?

Studies examining children's basic understanding of conditionals have led to very different conclusions. On the one hand, conditional inference tasks suggest that young children are able to interpret familiar conditionals in a complex manner. In contrast, truth-table tasks suggest that before adolescence, children have limited (conjunctive) representations of conditionals.

Additional evidence for a dual-strategy model of reasoning: Probabilistic reasoning is more invariant than reasoning about logical validity.

One of the major debates concerning the nature of inferential reasoning is between counterexample-based strategies such as mental model theory and the statistical strategies underlying probabilistic models. The dual-strategy model proposed by Verschueren, Schaeken, and d'Ydewalle (2005a, 2005b) suggests that people might have access to both kinds of strategies. One of the postulates of this approach is that statistical strategies correspond to low-cost, intuitive modes of evaluation, whereas counterexample strategies are higher-cost and more variable in use.

Deductive updating is not Bayesian.

One of the major debates concerning the nature of inferential reasoning is between counterexample-based theories such as mental model theory and probabilistic theories. This study looks at conclusion updating after the addition of statistical information to examine the hypothesis that deductive reasoning cannot be explained by probabilistic inferences. In Study 1, participants were given an initial "If P then Q rule" for a phenomenon on a recently discovered planet, told that "Q was true," and asked to make a judgment of either deductive validity or probabilistic likelihood of the putative conclusion that "P is true.