Beware 'persuasive communication devices' when writing and reading scientific articles.

Authors rely on a range of devices and techniques to attract and maintain the interest of readers, and to convince them of the merits of the author's point of view. However, when writing a scientific article, authors must use these 'persuasive communication devices' carefully. In particular, they must be explicit about the limitations of their work, avoid obfuscation, and resist the temptation to oversell their results.

Sixty Years After Orne's Article: A Conceptual Framework for Subjective Experiences Elicited by Demand Characteristics.

Study participants form beliefs based on cues present in a testing situation (demand characteristics). These beliefs can alter study outcomes (demand effects). Neglecting demand effects can threaten the internal and external validity of studies (including their replication).

Effect of alcohol on the sense of agency in healthy humans.

Even at low to moderate doses, ingestion of the widely used recreational drug alcohol (ethanol) can impact cognitive and emotional processing. Recent studies show that the sense of agency (SoA; ie, the subjective experience of voluntary control over actions) can be modulated by specific pharmacological manipulations. The SoA, as quantified by the intentional binding (IB) paradigm, is enhanced by direct or indirect dopaminergic agonists in patients with Parkinson's disease and by ketamine (an N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) receptor antagonist) in healthy individuals.

Intentional binding as Bayesian cue combination: Testing predictions with trait individual differences.

We investigated differences in intentional binding in high and low hypnotizable groups to explore two questions relating to (a) trait differences in the availability of motor intentions to metacognitive processes and (b) a proposed cue combination model of binding. An experience of involuntariness is central to hypnotic responding and may arise from strategically being unaware of one's intentions. Trait differences in the ability to respond to hypnotic suggestion may reflect differing levels of access to motor intentions.

Intentional Binding Without Intentional Action.

The experience of authorship over one's actions and their consequences-sense of agency-is a fundamental aspect of conscious experience. In recent years, it has become common to use intentional binding as an implicit measure of the sense of agency. However, it remains contentious whether reported intentional-binding effects indicate the role of intention-related information in perception or merely represent a strong case of multisensory causal binding.

Time perception and the experience of agency in meditation and hypnosis.

Mindfulness meditation and hypnosis are related in opposing ways to awareness of intentions. The cold control theory of hypnosis proposes that hypnotic responding involves the experience of involuntariness while performing an actually intentional action. Hypnosis therefore relies upon inaccurate metacognition about intentional actions and experiences.

The Power of Suggestion: Posthypnotically Induced Changes in the Temporal Binding of Intentional Action Outcomes.

The sense of agency is the experience of initiating and controlling one's voluntary actions and their outcomes. Intentional binding (i.e.

Illusory Temporal Binding in Meditators.

We investigate conditions in which more accurate metacognition may lead to greater susceptibility to illusion and thus conditions under which mindfulness meditation may lead to less accurate perceptions. Specifically, greater awareness of intentions may lead to an illusory compression of time between a voluntary action and its outcome ("intentional binding"). Here, we report that experienced Buddhist mindfulness meditators rather than non-meditators display a greater illusory shift of the timing of an outcome toward an intentional action.

Metacognition of intentions in mindfulness and hypnosis.

In a famous series of experiments, Libet investigated the subjective timing of awareness of an intention to move, a task that can be considered a metacognitive judgement. The ability to strategically produce inaccurate metacognitions about intentions has been postulated to be central to the changes in judgements of agency common to all hypnotic responding. Therefore, differences in hypnotisability may be reflected in Libet's measure.