The problem of psychopathology and phenomenology. What is viable and not viable in phenomenological psychiatry.

The epistemological underpinnings of psychiatric theory and practice have always been unstable. This reflects the essential contradiction existing between the task (the description and individuation of speech and behavior as psychopathological symptoms) and tools (semiotics). As a result of this contradiction, the history of psychiatry is one of permanent crisis in which there are moments of temporary stability as approaches that aim at organizing this mismatch between tasks and tools gain prevalence.

Should definitions for mental disorders include explicit theoretical elements?

In this article we argue that mental disorders have come to be defined according to a descriptive theory of meaning. In other words, mental disorders are defined according to superficial descriptive criteria that count as necessary and sufficient criteria for the inclusion of a particular instance under its corresponding class. These descriptive criteria are allegedly theory independent, leading to the assumption that psychiatric symptoms are directly identified in an object-like fashion.

Misunderstanding psychopathology as medical semiology: an epistemological enquiry.

In our everyday clinical experience we encounter significant problems directly related to the instability of psychopathological concepts. In order to trace the origin of this inconsistency, the nature of these concepts will be explored in their historical development. They will be compared to those pertaining to medical semiology, paying special attention to the specific nature of the 'object' each of them refers to.