Publications by authors named "P Droege"

Background: This article describes the study design of the quantitative part of the VersKiK study, The primary objectives of this study are to examine the occurrence of late effects in survivors of childhood or adolescent cancer (module 1), investigate health-related vulnerabilities and medical service utilization within this survivor group (modules 1 and 3), and assess the alignment between documented follow-up care for cardiological and audiological late effects with guideline recommendations, along with evaluating the extent of adherence among paediatric cancer survivors (module 3).

Methods: This is a non-interventional retrospective observational cohort study. It is based on stochastically linked insurance claims data from approximately 150,000 statutory insured persons with information concerning around 25,000-30,000 cancer survivors recorded in the German Childhood Cancer Register (GCCR).

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A challenge to developing a model for testing animal consciousness is the pull of opposite intuitions. On one extreme, the anthropocentric view holds that consciousness is a highly sophisticated capacity involving self-reflection and conceptual categorization that is almost certainly exclusive to humans. At the opposite extreme, an anthropomorphic view attributes consciousness broadly to any behavior that involves sensory responsiveness.

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Trace conditioning involves the pairing of a neutral conditioned stimulus (CS), followed by a short interval with a motivationally significant unconditioned stimulus (UCS). Recently, trace conditioning has been proposed as a test for animal consciousness due to its correlation in humans with subjective report of the CS-UCS connection. We argue that the distractor task in the Clark and Squire (1998) study on trace conditioning has been overlooked.

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An assessment of consciousness in nonverbal animals requires a framework for research that extends testing methods beyond subjective report. This chapter proposes a working definition of consciousness in terms of temporal representation that provides the critical link between internal phenomenology and external behavior and neural structure. Our claim is that consciousness represents the present moment as distinct from the past and the future in order to flexibly respond to stimuli.

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Consciousness has a peculiar affinity for presence; conscious states represent their contents as now. To understand how conscious states come to represent time in this way, we need a distinction between a mental state that represents now and one that simply occurs now. A teleofunctional theory accounts for the distinction in terms of the development and function of explicit temporal representation.

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