Exploring the optimal reverse supply chain for e-waste treatment under Chinese government subsidy.

This study aims to analyze the influence of Chinese government subsidy on e-waste treatment formal and informal reverse supply chains (RSC) and to explore the optimal formal channel structure. Under the formal recycler-Stackelberg game, we establish three game theory models respectively under the conditions of price insensitive and price sensitive overall collection quantity. In each model, a dual-channel RSC, the green technology investment decision of formal recycler and a subsidy for formal recycler are modelled.

Formalisation of informal collectors under a dual-recycling channel: A game theoretic approach.

Formalisation of informal collectors is beneficial for economical, environmental and social sustainability. Through dividing collectors and recyclers, a benchmark model consists of competitive dual formal and informal channels is established to quantitatively analyse the possibility of formalising informal collectors and study the formalisation extent. This study comprehensively compares the effects of respective subsidy or punishment targeting at collectors or recyclers in the extended policy model.

Province-level estimation of waste mobile phones in China and location planning of recycling centers.

This paper aims to uncover the spatial distribution of waste mobile phones and perform a preliminary optimization of the location of waste mobile phone recycling centers in China. This study first selects the best-suited among the logistic, Gompertz, and Bass models to forecast the per capita holding quantity of mobile phones. Combined with the population projected by the GM(1,1) and logistic models, the spatial distribution of waste mobile phones is uncovered through the stock-based model.