Alternative Types of Ambiguity and their Effects on Climate Change Regulation.

This paper focuses on different types of ambiguity that affect climate change regulation. In particular, we analyze the effects of the interaction among three types of agents, namely, the decision-maker (DM), the climate change experts, and the society, on the probabilistic properties of green-house gas (GHG) emissions and the formation of environmental policy. These effects are analyzed under two types of ambiguity: "deferential ambiguity" and "preferential ambiguity".

Ambiguity aversion, modern Bayesianism and small worlds.

The central question of this paper is whether a rational agent under uncertainty can exhibit ambiguity aversion (AA). The answer to this question depends on the way the agent forms her probabilistic beliefs: classical Bayesianism (CB) vs modern Bayesianism (MB). We revisit Schmeidler's coin-based example and show that a rational MB agent operating in the context of a "small world", cannot exhibit AA.