The roles of behavioral and affective cues and false belief in children's trait attributions.

Children as young as 3 years can make trait attributions based on behavioral and emotional cues, but such skills continue to develop across childhood. ​Theory of mind understanding, the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others, may provide a foundation for early development of trait attributions. The purpose of the current study was to explore the impact of behavioral and affective cues on children's trait attributions, if their attributes changed incrementally across five repeated instances of an observed behavior, and to what extent such patterns of attributions are related to false belief, a key concept of theory of mind.

Children's spontaneous counterfactuals: The roles of valence, expectancy, and cognitive flexibility.

The current set of studies examined whether 8- to 11-year-olds generate counterfactuals spontaneously and whether outcome valence and outcome expectancy affect counterfactual reasoning within this age group. The role of cognitive flexibility in such reasoning also was explored. In Study 1, relatively few children spontaneously generated counterfactuals, yet both outcome expectancy and outcome valence influenced counterfactual reasoning.

The contribution of theory of mind, counterfactual reasoning, and executive function to pre-readers' language comprehension and later reading awareness and comprehension in elementary school.

The current longitudinal study examined the roles of theory of mind, counterfactual reasoning, and executive function in children's pre-reading skills, reading awareness, and reading comprehension. It is the first to examine this set of variables with preschool and school-aged children. A sample of 31 children completed language comprehension, working memory, cognitive flexibility, first-order false belief, and counterfactual reasoning measures when they were 3 to 5 years of age and completed second-order false belief, cognitive flexibility, reading comprehension, and reading awareness measures at 6 to 9 years of age.

The roles of explanation and feedback in false belief understanding: a microgenetic analysis.

The authors examined effects of feedback and explanation on false belief performance. Thirty-three children (42-54 months; 15 girls, 18 boys) were randomly assigned to four treatment conditions: explanation, feedback, feedback researcher explains, and feedback child explains. Children completed false belief tasks during pretraining, 8 training sessions, and posttraining across 6 weeks.

Counterfactual thinking and false belief: the role of executive function.

The purpose of the current study was to examine further the relationship between counterfactual thinking and false belief (FB) as examined by Guajardo and Turley-Ames (Cognitive Development, 19 (2004) 53-80). More specifically, the current research examined the importance of working memory and inhibitory control in understanding the relationship between counterfactual thinking and FB. Participants were 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds (N=76).

Associations among false belief understanding, counterfactual reasoning, and executive function.

The primary purposes of the present study were to clarify previous work on the association between counterfactual thinking and false belief performance to determine (1) whether these two variables are related and (2) if so, whether executive function skills mediate the relationship. A total of 92 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds completed false belief, counterfactual, working memory, representational flexibility, and language measures. Counterfactual reasoning accounted for limited unique variance in false belief.

Narrative discourse and theory of mind development.

The authors examined experimentally whether exposure to social discourse about concepts related to mental states could promote changes in children's theory of mind understanding. In 2 studies, 3- to 4-year-old children were assigned to either a training or a no training control condition. All children were administered several theory of mind measures at pretest and 2 posttests.