Resource-rational contractualism: A triple theory of moral cognition.

It is widely agreed upon that morality guides people with conflicting interests towards agreements of mutual benefit. We therefore might expect numerous proposals for organizing human moral cognition around the logic of bargaining, negotiation, and agreement. Yet, while "contractualist" ideas play an important role in moral philosophy, they are starkly underrepresented in the field of moral psychology.

How do people predict a random walk? Lessons for models of human cognition.

Repeated forecasts of changing values are common in many everyday tasks, from predicting the weather to financial markets. A particularly simple and informative instance of such fluctuating values are : Sequences in which each point is a random movement from only its preceding value, unaffected by any previous points. Moreover, random walks often yield basic rational forecasting solutions in which predictions of new values should repeat the most recent value, and hence replicate the properties of the original series.

When rules are over-ruled: Virtual bargaining as a contractualist method of moral judgment.

Rules help guide our behavior-particularly in complex social contexts. But rules sometimes give us the "wrong" answer. How do we know when it is okay to break the rules? In this paper, we argue that we sometimes use contractualist (agreement-based) mechanisms to determine when a rule can be broken.

The statistics of cognitive variability: Explaining common patterns in individuals, groups and financial markets.

Psychological variability (i.e., "noise") displays interesting structure which is hidden by the common practice of averaging over trials.

Contractualist tendencies and reasoning in moral judgment and decision making.

The social-contract tradition of Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, and Rawls has been widely influential in moral philosophy but has until recently received relatively little attention in moral psychology. For contractualist moral theories, ethics is a matter of forming, adhering to, and enforcing (hypothetical) agreements, and morality is fundamentally about acting according to what would be agreed by rational agents. A recent psychological theory, virtual bargaining, models social interactions in contractualist terms, suggesting that we often act as we would agree to do if we were to negotiate explicitly.

Conversational technology and reactions to withheld information.

People frequently face decisions that require making inferences about withheld information. The advent of large language models coupled with conversational technology, e.g.

Explaining the flaws in human random generation as local sampling with momentum.

In many tasks, human behavior is far noisier than is optimal. Yet when asked to behave randomly, people are typically too predictable. We argue that these apparently contrasting observations have the same origin: the operation of a general-purpose local sampling algorithm for probabilistic inference.

Where next for behavioral public policy?

Our target article distinguishes between policy approaches that seek to address societal problems through intervention at the level of the individual (adopting the "i-frame") and those that seek to change the system within which those individuals live (adopting the "s-frame"). We stress also that a long-standing tactic of corporations opposing systemic change is to promote the i-frame perspective, presumably hoping that i-frame interventions will be largely ineffective and more importantly will be seen by the public and some policy makers as a genuine alternative to systemic change. We worry that the i-frame focus of much of behavioral science has inadvertently reinforced this unhelpful focus on the individual.

The autocorrelated Bayesian sampler: A rational process for probability judgments, estimates, confidence intervals, choices, confidence judgments, and response times.

Normative models of decision-making that optimally transform noisy (sensory) information into categorical decisions qualitatively mismatch human behavior. Indeed, leading computational models have only achieved high empirical corroboration by adding task-specific assumptions that deviate from normative principles. In response, we offer a Bayesian approach that implicitly produces a posterior distribution of possible answers (hypotheses) in response to sensory information.

A unified explanation of variability and bias in human probability judgments: How computational noise explains the mean-variance signature.

Human probability judgments are both variable and subject to systematic biases. Most probability judgment models treat variability and bias separately: a deterministic model explains the origin of bias, to which a noise process is added to generate variability. But these accounts do not explain the characteristic inverse U-shaped signature linking mean and variance in probability judgments.

The ephemeral stories of our lives.

Johnson et al. make a persuasive case that qualitative, story-like reasoning plays a crucial role in everyday thought and decision-making. This commentary questions the cohesiveness of this type of reasoning and the representations that generate it.

From the pragmatics of charades to the creation of language.

We agree with Heintz & Scott-Phillips that pragmatics does not supplement, but is prior to and underpins, language. Indeed, human non-linguistic communication is astonishingly rich, flexible, and subtle, as we illustrate through the game of charades, where people improvise communicative signals when linguistic channels are blocked. The route from non-linguistic charade-like communication to combinatorial language involves (1) local processes of conventionalization and grammaticalization and (2) spontaneous order arising from mutual constraints between different communicative signals.

Rationality as the end of thought.

Bermúdez convincingly argues that framing effects are ubiquitous and that this is not a sign of human irrationality, but an unavoidable feature of any intelligent system. The commentary adds that framing effects arise even in formal domains, such as chess and mathematics, which appear paradigms of rational thought. Indeed, finding and attempting to resolve clashes between different frames is a major impetus for deliberative cognition.

The computational society.

How do individual human minds create languages, legal systems, scientific theories, and technologies? From a cognitive science viewpoint, such collective phenomena may be considered a type of distributed computation in which human minds together solve computational problems beyond any individual. This viewpoint may also shift our perspective on individual minds.

The i-frame and the s-frame: How focusing on individual-level solutions has led behavioral public policy astray.

An influential line of thinking in behavioral science, to which the two authors have long subscribed, is that many of society's most pressing problems can be addressed cheaply and effectively at the level of the individual, without modifying the system in which the individual operates. We now believe this was a mistake, along with, we suspect, many colleagues in both the academic and policy communities. Results from such interventions have been disappointingly modest.

Understanding the structure of cognitive noise.

Human cognition is fundamentally noisy. While routinely regarded as a nuisance in experimental investigation, the few studies investigating properties of cognitive noise have found surprising structure. A first line of research has shown that inter-response-time distributions are heavy-tailed.

Perceptual and Cognitive Judgments Show Both Anchoring and Repulsion.

One of the most robust effects in cognitive psychology is , in which judgments show a bias toward previously viewed values. However, in what is essentially the same task as used in anchoring research, a perceptual illusion demonstrates the opposite effect of . Here, we united these two literatures, testing in two experiments with adults (total = 200) whether prior comparative decisions bias cognitive and perceptual judgments in opposing directions or whether anchoring and repulsion are two domain-general biases whose co-occurrence has so far gone undetected.

The paradox of social interaction: Shared intentionality, we-reasoning, and virtual bargaining.

Social interaction is both ubiquitous and central to understanding human behavior. Such interactions depend, we argue, on shared intentionality: the parties must form a common understanding of an ambiguous interaction (e.g.

Instantaneous systems of communicative conventions through virtual bargaining.

People can instantaneously create novel conventions that link individual communicative signals to meanings, both in experiments and everyday communication. Yet a basic principle of natural communication is that the meaning of a signal typically contrasts with the meanings of alternative signals that were available but not chosen. That is, communicative conventions typically form a system, rather than consisting of isolated signal-meaning pairs.

Clarifying the relationship between coherence and accuracy in probability judgments.

Bayesian approaches presuppose that following the coherence conditions of probability theory makes probabilistic judgments more accurate. But other influential theories claim accurate judgments (with high "ecological rationality") do not need to be coherent. Empirical results support these latter theories, threatening Bayesian models of intelligence; and suggesting, moreover, that "heuristics and biases" research, which focuses on violations of coherence, is largely irrelevant.

Changing behaviour for net zero 2050.

argue for rapid, radical changes to the infrastructure and pricing systems that currently support unhealthy unsustainable behaviour

REFRESH: A new approach to modeling dimensional biases in perceptual similarity and categorization.

Much categorization behavior can be explained by family resemblance: New items are classified by comparison with previously learned exemplars. However, categorization behavior also shows a variety of dimensional biases, where the underlying space has so-called "separable" dimensions: Ease of learning categories depends on how the stimuli align with the separable dimensions of the space. For example, if a set of objects of various sizes and colors can be accurately categorized using a single separable dimension (e.

Sinking In: The Peripheral Baldwinisation of Human Cognition.

The Baldwin effect is a hypothetical process in which a learned response to environmental change evolves a genetic basis. Modelling has shown that the Baldwin effect offers a plausible and elegant explanation for the emergence of complex behavioural traits, but there is little direct empirical evidence for its occurrence. We highlight experimental evidence of the Baldwin effect and argue that it acts preferentially on peripheral rather than on central cognitive processes.