Scientific and religious beliefs are primarily shaped by testimony.

Understanding why individuals are more confident of the existence of invisible scientific phenomena (e.g., oxygen) than invisible religious phenomena (e.

Expressions of uncertainty in invisible scientific and religious phenomena during naturalistic conversation.

Across cultures, studies report more confidence in the existence of unobservable scientific phenomena, such as germs, as compared to unobservable religious phenomena, such as angels. We investigated a potential cultural mechanism for the transmission of confidence in the existence of invisible entities. Specifically, we asked whether parents in societies with markedly different religious profiles-Iran and China-signal differential confidence across the domains of science and religion during unmoderated conversations with their children (N = 120 parent-child dyads in total; 5- to 11-year-olds).

Miraculous, magical, or mundane? The development of beliefs about stories with divine, magical, or realistic causation.

Children's naïve theories about causal regularities enable them to differentiate factual narratives describing real events and characters from fictional narratives describing made-up events and characters (Corriveau, Kim, Schwalen, & Harris, Cognition 113 (2): 213-225, 2009). But what happens when children are consistently presented with accounts of miraculous and causally impossible events as real occurrences? Previous research has shown that preschoolers with consistent exposure to religious teaching tend to systematically judge characters involved in fantastical or religious events as real (Corriveau et al., Cognitive Science, 39 (2), 353-382, 2015; Davoodi et al.

Children's Ideas About What Can Really Happen: The Impact of Age and Religious Background.

Five- to 11-year-old U.S. children, from either a religious or secular background, judged whether story events could really happen.

Children's developing capacity to calibrate the verbal testimony of others with observed evidence when inferring causal relations.

Across two studies (N = 120), we investigated the development of children's ability to calibrate the certainty of verbal testimony with observable data that varied in the degree of predictive causal accuracy. In Study 1, 4- and 5-year-olds heard a certain explanation or an uncertain explanation about deterministic causal relations. The 5-year-olds made more accurate causal inferences when the informant provided a certain and more calibrated explanation.

Conflicting perspectives mediate the relation between parents' and preschoolers' self-referent mental state talk during collaboration.

We examined the relations between the referent of parents and preschoolers' mental state talk during a collaborative puzzle-solving task (N = 146 dyads; n = 81 3-year-olds, n = 65 4-year-olds). The results showed that parents' references to their own knowledge and beliefs (self-referent cognitive talk), and references to their child's knowledge and beliefs (child-referent cognitive talk) were both related to children's (primarily self-referent) cognitive talk. We then tested whether any of the observed relations could be explained by the presence of conflicting perspectives within the collaborative interaction.

But how does it develop? Adopting a sociocultural lens to the development of intergroup bias among children.

We argue that adopting a sociocultural lens to the origins of intergroup bias is important for understanding the nature of attacking and defending behavior at a group level. We specifically propose that the potential divergence in the development of in-group affiliation and out-group derogation supports De Dreu and Gross's framework but does indicate that more emphasis on early sociocultural input is required.

Encouraging children to mentalise about a perceived outgroup increases prosocial behaviour towards outgroup members.

We investigated whether encouraging young children to discuss the mental states of an immigrant group would elicit more prosocial behaviour towards them and impact on their perception of a group member's emotional experience. Five- and 6-year-old children were either prompted to talk about the thoughts and feelings of this social group or to talk about their actions. Across two studies, we found that this manipulation increased the extent to which children shared with a novel member of the immigrant group who was the victim of a minor transgression.

The Developmental Origins of Dehumanization.

Dehumanization is a complex social phenomenon, intimately connected to intergroup harm and neglect. However, developmental research has only recently started to investigate this important topic. In this chapter, we review research in areas closely related to dehumanization including children's intergroup preferences, essentialist conceptions of social groups, and understanding of relative status.

Young Children Are More Likely to Spontaneously Attribute Mental States to Members of Their Own Group.

We investigated whether young children were more likely to spontaneously attribute mental states to members of their own social group than to members of an out-group. We asked 5- and 6-year-old children to describe the actions of interacting geometric shapes and manipulated whether the children believed these shapes represented their own group or another group. Children of both ages spontaneously used mental-state words more often in their description of in-group members compared with out-group members.