Priming of lowpass-filtered speech affects response bias, not sensitivity, in a bandwidth discrimination task.

Priming is demonstrated when prior information about the content of a distorted, filtered, or masked auditory message improves its clarity. The current experiment attempted to quantify aspects of priming by determining its effects on performance and bias in a lowpass-filter-cutoff frequency discrimination task. Nonsense sentences recorded by a female talker were sharply lowpass filtered at a nominal cutoff frequency (F) of 0.

Unequal-strength source zROC slopes reflect criteria placement and not (necessarily) memory processes.

Source memory zROC slopes change from below 1 to above 1 depending on which source gets the strongest learning. This effect has been attributed to memory processes, either in terms of a threshold source recollection process or changes in the variability of continuous source evidence. We propose 2 decision mechanisms that can produce the slope effect, and we test them in 3 experiments.

Positive and negative remember judgments and ROCs in the plurals paradigm: evidence for alternative decision strategies.

Using old-new ratings and remember-know judgments we explored the plurals paradigm, in which studied words must be distinguished from plurality-changed lures. The paradigm allowed us to investigate negative remembering--that is, the remembering of a plural-altered study item; capacity for this judgment was found to be poorer than or equivalent to the conventional positive remembering. A response-bias manipulation affected positive but not negative remembering.

Evaluating models of remember-know judgments: complexity, mimicry, and discriminability.

Remember-know judgments provide additional information in recognition memory tests, but the nature of this information and the attendant decision process are in dispute. Competing models have proposed that remember judgments reflect a sum of familiarity and recollective information (the one-dimensional model), are based on a difference between these strengths (STREAK), or are purely recollective (the dual-process model). A choice among these accounts is sometimes made by comparing the precision of their fits to data, but this strategy may be muddied by differences in model complexity: Some models that appear to provide good fits may simply be better able to mimic the data produced by other models.

Interpreting the effects of response bias on remember-know judgments using signal detection and threshold models.

In recognition memory experiments, the tendency to identify a test item as "old" or "new" can be increased or decreased by instructions given at test. The effect of such response bias on remember-know judgments is to change "remember" as well as "old" responses. Existing models of the remember-know paradigm (based on dual-process and signal detection theories) interpret this effect as a shift i nresponse criteria, but differ on the nature ofthe dimension along which t he changes take place.

Measures of sensitivity based on a single hit rate and false alarm rate: the accuracy, precision, and robustness of d', Az, and A'.

Signal detection theory offers several indexes of sensitivity (d', Az, and A') that are appropriate for two-choice discrimination when data consist of one hit rate and one false alarm rate per condition. These measures require simplifying assumptions about how target and lure evidence is distributed. We examine three statistical properties of these indexes: accuracy (good agreement between the parameter and the sampling distribution mean), precision (small variance of the sampling distribution), and robustness (small influence of violated assumptions on accuracy).

Deciding about decision models of remember and know judgments: a reply to Murdock (2006).

B. B. Murdock (2006) has interpreted remember-know data within a decision space defined by item and associative information, the fundamental variables in his general recognition memory model TODAM (B.

The remember response: subject to bias, graded, and not a process-pure indicator of recollection.

Recognition memory judgments have long been assumed to depend on the contributions of two underlying processes: recollection and familiarity. We measured recollection with receiver-operating characteristic (ROC) data and remember-know judgments. Under standard remember-know instructions, the two estimates of recollection diverged.

On the importance of models in interpreting remember-know experiments: comments on Gardiner et al.'s (2002) meta-analysis.

From a meta-analysis of recognition experiments using the remember-know-guess paradigm, Gardiner, Ramponi, and Richardson-Klavehn (2002) reported two findings that they viewed as evidence against the one-dimensional model for that paradigm: (1) Memory strength increased when know responses were added to remember responses, decreasing when guess responses were also included. (2) The accuracy of guess responses was correlated with the location of the old-new criterion in the one-dimensional model for the paradigm, implying that guesses were influenced by decision processes. We question both findings.

The sampling distributions of Gaussian ROC statistics.

For a discrimination experiment, a plot of the hit rate against the false-alarm rate--the ROC curve--summarizes performance across a range of confidence levels. In many content areas, ROCs are well described by a normal-distribution model and the z-transformed hit and false-alarm rates are approximately linearly related. We examined the sampling distributions of three parameters of this model when applied to a ratings procedure: the area under the ROC (Az), the normalized difference between the means of the underlying signal and noise distributions (da), and the slope of the ROC on z-coordinates (s).