The Impact of Financial Assistance Programs on Health Care Utilization: Evidence from Kaiser Permanente.

Most hospitals have financial assistance programs for low-income patients. We use administrative data from Kaiser Permanente to study the effects of financial assistance on healthcare utilization. Using a regression discontinuity design based on an income threshold for program eligibility, we find that financial assistance increases the likelihood of an inpatient, ambulatory and emergency department encounter by 3.

Financial Incentives to Facilities and Clinicians Treating Patients With End-stage Kidney Disease and Use of Home Dialysis: A Randomized Clinical Trial.

Importance: Home dialysis rates for end-stage kidney disease (ESKD) treatment are substantially lower in the US than in other high-income countries, yet there is limited knowledge on how to increase these rates.

Objective: To report results from the first year of a nationwide randomized clinical trial that provides financial incentives to ESKD facilities and managing clinicians to increase home dialysis rates.

Design, Setting, And Participants: Results were analyzed from the first year of the End-Stage Renal Disease Treatment Choice (ETC) model, a multiyear, mandatory-participation randomized clinical trial designed and implemented by the US Center for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation.

Trends in Medical Debt During the COVID-19 Pandemic.

This cross-sectional study evaluates the association between the COVID-19 pandemic and reported new medical debt from 2018 to 2021 across the US.

VOLUNTARY REGULATION: EVIDENCE FROM MEDICARE PAYMENT REFORM.

Government programs are often offered on an optional basis to market participants. We explore the economics of such voluntary regulation in the context of a Medicare payment reform, in which one medical provider receives a single, predetermined payment for a sequence of related healthcare services, instead of separate service-specific payments. This "bundled payment" program was originally implemented as a 5-year randomized trial, with mandatory participation by hospitals assigned to the new payment model; however, after two years, participation was made voluntary for half of these hospitals.

Hospital Lawsuits Over Unpaid Bills Increased By 37 Percent In Wisconsin From 2001 To 2018.

We analyzed Wisconsin court records from the period 2001-18 to document trends in hospital lawsuits to recover patients' unpaid medical bills. These lawsuits increased 37 percent during this period, from 1.12 per 1,000 residents in 2001 to 1.

Medical Debt in the US, 2009-2020.

Importance: Medical debt is an increasing concern in the US, yet there is limited understanding of the amount and distribution of medical debt, and its association with health care policies.

Objective: To measure the amount of medical debt nationally and by geographic region and income group and its association with Medicaid expansion under the Affordable Care Act.

Design, Setting, And Participants: Data on medical debt in collections were obtained from a nationally representative 10% panel of consumer credit reports between January 2009 and June 2020 (reflecting care provided prior to the COVID-19 pandemic).

Randomized trial shows healthcare payment reform has equal-sized spillover effects on patients not targeted by reform.

Changes in the way health insurers pay healthcare providers may not only directly affect the insurer's patients but may also affect patients covered by other insurers. We provide evidence of such spillovers in the context of a nationwide Medicare bundled payment reform that was implemented in some areas of the country but not in others, via random assignment. We estimate that the payment reform-which targeted traditional Medicare patients-had effects of similar magnitude on the healthcare experience of nontargeted, privately insured Medicare Advantage patients.

Provider Incentives and Healthcare Costs: Evidence from Long-Term Care Hospitals.

We study the design of provider incentives in the post-acute care setting - a high-stakes but under-studied segment of the healthcare system. We focus on long-term care hospitals (LTCHs) and the large (approximately $13,500) jump in Medicare payments they receive when a patient s stay reaches a threshold number of days. Discharges increase substantially after the threshold, with the marginal discharged patient in relatively better health.

Mandatory Medicare Bundled Payment Program for Lower Extremity Joint Replacement and Discharge to Institutional Postacute Care: Interim Analysis of the First Year of a 5-Year Randomized Trial.

Importance: Bundled payments are an increasingly common alternative payment model for Medicare, yet there is limited evidence regarding their effectiveness.

Objective: To report interim outcomes from the first year of implementation of a bundled payment model for lower extremity joint replacement (LEJR).

Design, Setting, And Participants: As part of a 5-year, mandatory-participation randomized trial by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, eligible metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) were randomized to the Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement (CJR) bundled payment model for LEJR episodes or to a control group.

Do Larger Health Insurance Subsidies Benefit Patients or Producers? Evidence from Medicare Advantage.

A central question in the debate over privatized Medicare is whether increased government payments to private Medicare Advantage (MA) plans generate lower premiums for consumers or higher profits for producers. Using difference‑in‑differences variation brought about by a sharp legislative change, we find that MA insurers pass through 45 percent of increased payments in lower premiums and an additional 9 percent in more generous benefits. We show that advantageous selection into MA cannot explain this incomplete pass‑through.

Bankruptcy as Implicit Health Insurance.

This paper examines the implicit health insurance that households receive from the ability to declare bankruptcy. Exploiting multiple sources of variation in asset exemption law, I show that uninsured households with a greater financial cost of bankruptcy make higher out-of-pocket medical payments, conditional on the amount of care received. In turn, I find that households with greater wealth at risk are more likely to hold health insurance.

Pricing and Welfare in Health Plan Choice.

Premiums in health insurance markets frequently do not reflect individual differences in costs, either because consumers have private information or because prices are not risk rated. This creates inefficiencies when consumers self-select into plans. We develop a simple econometric model to study this problem and estimate it using data on small employers.