The emotional impact of baseless discrediting of knowledge: An empirical investigation of epistemic injustice.

According to theoretical work on epistemic injustice, baseless discrediting of the knowledge of people with marginalized social identities is a central driver of prejudice and discrimination. Discrediting of knowledge may sometimes be subtle, but it is pernicious, inducing chronic stress and coping strategies such as emotional avoidance. In this research, we sought to deepen the understanding of epistemic injustice's impact by examining emotional responses to being discredited and assessing if marginalized social group membership predicts these responses.

Implicit Cognition and Gifts: How Does social Psychology help Us Think Differently about Medical Practice?

This article takes the following two assumptions for granted: first, that gifts influence physicians and, second, that the influences gifts have on physicians may be harmful for patients. These assumptions are common in the applied ethics literature, and they prompt an obvious practical question, namely, what is the best way to mitigate the negative effects? We examine the negative effects of gift giving in depth, considering how the influence occurs, and we assert that the ethical debate surrounding gift-giving practices must be reoriented. Our main claim is that the failure of recent policies addressing gift giving can be traced to a misunderstanding of what psychological mechanisms are most likely to underpin physicians' biased behavior as a result of interaction with the medical industry.

Do we know how stressed we are?

I take issue with Kalisch et al.'s formulation of PASTOR, arguing that care must be taken in understanding what is meant by "appraisal." I examine the implications of PASTOR given two competing possibilities for what counts as an appraisal - first, if appraisal is restricted to conscious reflection on one's circumstances, and second, if appraisal is expanded to include subconscious mechanisms of evaluation.

Should an individual composed of selfish goals be held responsible for her actions?

We discuss the implications of the Selfish Goal model for moral responsibility, arguing it suggests a form of skepticism we call the "locus problem." In denying that individuals contain any genuine psychological core of information processing, the Selfish Goal model denies the kind of locus of control intuitively presupposed by ascriptions of responsibility. We briefly consider ways the problem might be overcome.