Moving Forward: On the Limits of Motor-Based Forward Models.

The human ability to anticipate the consequences that result from action is an essential building block for cognitive, emotional, and social functioning. A dominant view is that this faculty is based on motor predictions, in which a forward model uses a copy of the motor command to predict imminent sensory action-consequences. Although this account was originally conceived to explain the processing of action-outcomes that are tightly coupled to bodily movements, it has been increasingly extrapolated to effects beyond the body.

Perception of action-outcomes is shaped by life-long and contextual expectations.

The way humans perceive the outcomes of their actions is strongly colored by their expectations. These expectations can develop over different timescales and are not always complementary. The present work examines how long-term (structural) expectations - developed over a lifetime - and short-term (contextual) expectations jointly affect perception.

Exploring the role of motor and non-motor predictive mechanisms in sensory attenuation: Perceptual and neurophysiological findings.

Sounds that result from our own actions are perceptually and neurophysiologically attenuated compared to sounds with an external origin. This sensory attenuation phenomenon is commonly attributed to prediction processes implicated in motor control. However, accumulating evidence suggests that attenuation effects can also result from prediction processes beyond the motor domain.

The influence of action-effect anticipation on bistable perception: differences between onset rivalry and ambiguous motion.

Perception is strongly shaped by the actions we perform. According to the theory of event coding, and forward models of motor control, goal-directed action preparation activates representations of desired effects. These expectations about the precise stimulus identity of one's action-outcomes (i.

Cortical information flow during inferences of agency.

Building on the recent finding that agency experiences do not merely rely on sensorimotor information but also on cognitive cues, this exploratory study uses electroencephalographic recordings to examine functional connectivity during agency inference processing in a setting where action and outcome are independent. Participants completed a computerized task in which they pressed a button followed by one of two color words (red or blue) and rated their experienced agency over producing the color. Before executing the action, a matching or mismatching color word was pre-activated by explicitly instructing participants to produce the color (goal condition) or by briefly presenting the color word (prime condition).

When moving without volition: implied self-causation enhances binding strength between involuntary actions and effects.

The conscious awareness of voluntary action is associated with systematic changes in time perception: The interval between actions and outcomes is experienced as compressed in time. Although this temporal binding is thought to result from voluntary movement and provides a window to the sense of agency, recent studies challenge this idea by demonstrating binding in involuntary movement. We offer a potential account for these findings by proposing that binding between involuntary actions and effects can occur when self-causation is implied.

Positive priming and intentional binding: eye-blink rate predicts reward information effects on the sense of agency.

Human society is strongly rooted in people's experiences of agency; that is, the pervasive feeling that one engages in voluntary behavior and causes one's own actions and resulting outcomes. Rewards and positive affect play an important role in the control of voluntary action. However, the role of positive reward signals in the sense of agency is poorly understood.