Population mobility, well-mixed clustering and disease spread: a look at COVID-19 Spread in the United States and preventive policy insights.

The epidemiology of pandemics is classically viewed using geographical and political borders; however, these artificial divisions can result in a misunderstanding of the current epidemiological state within a given region. To improve upon current methods, we propose a clustering algorithm which is capable of recasting regions into well-mixed clusters such that they have a high level of interconnection while minimizing the external flow of the population towards other clusters. Moreover, we analyze and identify so-called core clusters, clusters that retain their features over time (temporally stable) and independent of the presence or absence of policy measures.

Human behaviour, NPI and mobility reduction effects on COVID-19 transmission in different countries of the world.

Background: The outbreak of Coronavirus disease, which originated in Wuhan, China in 2019, has affected the lives of billions of people globally. Throughout 2020, the reproduction number of COVID-19 was widely used by decision-makers to explain their strategies to control the pandemic.

Methods: In this work, we deduce and analyze both initial and effective reproduction numbers for 12 diverse world regions between February and December of 2020.

Simulating preventative testing of SARS-CoV-2 in schools: policy implications.

Background: School testing for SARS-CoV-2 infection has become an important policy and planning issue as schools were reopened after the summer season and as the COVID-19 pandemic continues. Decisions to test or not to test and, if testing, how many tests, how often and for how long, are complex decisions that need to be taken under uncertainty and conflicting pressures from various stakeholders.

Method: We have developed an agent-based model and simulation tool that can be used to analyze the outcomes and effectiveness of different testing strategies and scenarios in schools with various number of classrooms and class sizes.

Multiplayer games and HIV transmission via casual encounters.

Population transmission models have been helpful in studying the spread of HIV. They assess changes made at the population level for different intervention strategies. To further understand how individual changes affect the population as a whole, game-theoretical models are used to quantify the decision-making process.

Runaway Competition: A Correction and Extension of Results for a Model of Competitive Helping.

We investigate and generalize an existing model of competitive helping within a biological market, first introduced for a population of competing individuals in which one individual provides help to all others; the rest compete for the help available from this individual by providing help themselves. Our generalized model comprises two strategies in which each individual of a specific type provides the same amount of help as all other individuals of that type. Each individual's fitness function is dependent on this level of help, the cost of providing the help, and the fact that help is proportionally reciprocated by other individuals.

Dynamic vaccination games and variational inequalities on time-dependent sets.

This paper presents a model of a dynamic vaccination game in a population consisting of a collection of groups, each of which holds distinct perceptions of vaccinating versus non-vaccinating risks. Vaccination is regarded here as a game due to the fact that the payoff to each population group depends on the so-called perceived probability of getting infected given a certain level of the vaccine coverage in the population, a level that is generally obtained by the vaccinating decisions of other members of a population. The novelty of this model resides in the fact that it describes a repeated vaccination game (over a finite time horizon) of population groups whose sizes vary with time.

Dynamics of vaccination strategies via projected dynamical systems.

Previous game theoretical analyses of vaccinating behaviour have underscored the strategic interaction between individuals attempting to maximise their health states, in situations where an individual's health state depends upon the vaccination decisions of others due to the presence of herd immunity. Here, we extend such analyses by applying the theories of variational inequalities (VI) and projected dynamical systems (PDS) to vaccination games. A PDS provides a dynamics that gives the conditions for existence, uniqueness and stability properties of Nash equilibria.