A model of faulty and faultless disagreement for post-hoc assessments of knowledge utilization in evidence-based policymaking.

When evidence-based policymaking is so often mired in disagreement and controversy, how can we know if the process is meeting its stated goals? We develop a novel mathematical model to study disagreements about adequate knowledge utilization, like those regarding wild horse culling, shark drumlines and facemask policies during pandemics. We find that, when stakeholders disagree, it is frequently impossible to tell whether any party is at fault. We demonstrate the need for a distinctive kind of transparency in evidence-based policymaking, which we call transparency of reasoning.

Empty space and the (positive) cosmological constant.

I discuss empty space, as it appears in the physical foundations of relativistic field theories and in the semiclassical study of isolated systems. Of particular interest is the relationship between empirical measurements of the cosmological constant and the question of appropriate representation of empty space by spacetimes, or models of general relativity. Also considered is a speculative move that shows up in one corner of quantum gravity research.

Trans-Planckian philosophy of cosmology.

I provide some philosophical groundwork for the recently proposed 'trans-Planckian censorship' conjecture in theoretical physics. In particular, I argue that structure formation in early universe cosmology is, at least as we typically understand it, autonomous with regards to quantum gravity, the high energy physics that governs the Planck regime in our universe. Trans-Planckian censorship is then seen as a means of rendering this autonomy an empirical constraint within ongoing quantum gravity research.

Priority and privilege in scientific discovery.

The priority rule in science has been interpreted as a behavior regulator for the scientific community, which benefits society by adequately structuring the distribution of intellectual labor across pre-existing research programs. Further, it has been lauded as an intuitively fair way to reward scientists for their contributions, as a special case of society's "grand reward scheme". However, we will argue that the current formal framework utilized to model the priority rule idealizes away important aspects of credit attribution, and does so in a way that impacts the conclusions drawn regarding its function in scientific communities.