Scientific experimental articles are modernist stories.

This paper attempts to revive the epistemological discussion of scientific articles. What are their epistemic aims, and how are they achieved? We argue that scientific experimental articles are best understood as a particular kind of narrative: i.e.

Counterpossibles in science: an experimental study.

A is a counterfactual whose antecedent is impossible. The says all counterpossibles are true solely because their antecedents are impossible. Recently, some have rejected the vacuity thesis by citing purported non-vacuous counterpossibles in science.

The material theory of induction and the epistemology of thought experiments.

John D. Norton is responsible for a number of influential views in contemporary philosophy of science. This paper will discuss two of them.

Taming theory with thought experiments: Understanding and scientific progress.

I claim that one way thought experiments contribute to scientific progress is by increasing scientific understanding. Understanding does not have a currently accepted characterization in the philosophical literature, but I argue that we already have ways to test for it. For instance, current pedagogical practice often requires that students demonstrate being in either or both of the following two states: 1) Having grasped the meaning of some relevant theory, concept, law or model, 2) Being able to apply that theory, concept, law or model fruitfully to new instances.