Men's facial width-to-height ratio predicts aggression: a meta-analysis.

Recent research has identified men's facial width-to-height ratio (fWHR) as a reliable predictor of aggressive tendencies and behavior. Other research, however, has failed to replicate the fWHR-aggression relationship and has questioned whether previous findings are robust. In the current paper, we synthesize existing work by conducting a meta-analysis to estimate whether and how fWHR predicts aggression.

Self-fulfilling prophecies as a link between men's facial width-to-height ratio and behavior.

The facial width-to-height ratio (fWHR) has been identified as a reliable predictor of men's behavior, with researchers focusing on evolutionary selection pressures as the underlying mechanism explaining these relationships. In this paper, we complement this approach and examine the extent to which social processes also determine the extent to which men's fWHR serves as a behavioral cue. Specifically, we propose that observers' treatment of target men based on the targets' fWHR subsequently affects behavior, leading the targets to behave in ways that are consistent with the observers' expectations (i.

A face only an investor could love: CEOs' facial structure predicts their firms' financial performance.

Researchers have theorized that innate personal traits are related to leadership success. Although links between psychological characteristics and leadership success have been well established, research has yet to identify any objective physical traits of leaders that predict organizational performance. In the research reported here, we identified leaders' facial structure as a specific physical trait that correlates with organizational performance.

Bad to the bone: facial structure predicts unethical behaviour.

Researchers spanning many scientific domains, including primatology, evolutionary biology and psychology, have sought to establish an evolutionary basis for morality. While researchers have identified social and cognitive adaptations that support ethical behaviour, a consensus has emerged that genetically determined physical traits are not reliable signals of unethical intentions or actions. Challenging this view, we show that genetically determined physical traits can serve as reliable predictors of unethical behaviour if they are also associated with positive signals in intersex and intrasex selection.

Predicting behavior in economic games by looking through the eyes of the players.

Social scientists often rely on economic experiments such as ultimatum and dictator games to understand human cooperation. Systematic deviations from economic predictions have inspired broader conceptions of self-interest that incorporate concerns for fairness. Yet no framework can describe all of the major results.

How implicit beliefs influence trust recovery.

After a trust violation, some people are quick to forgive, whereas others never trust again. In this report, we identify a key characteristic that moderates trust recovery: implicit beliefs of moral character. Individuals who believe that moral character can change over time (incremental beliefs) are more likely to trust their counterpart following an apology and trustworthy behavior than are individuals who believe that moral character cannot change (entity beliefs).

Implicit negotiation beliefs and performance: experimental and longitudinal evidence.

The authors argue that implicit negotiation beliefs, which speak to the expected malleability of negotiating ability, affect performance in dyadic negotiations. They expected negotiators who believe negotiating attributes are malleable (incremental theorists) to outperform negotiators who believe negotiating attributes are fixed (entity theorists). In Study 1, they gathered evidence of convergent and discriminant validity for the implicit negotiation belief construct.

Emotions and cooperation in economic games.

In this paper, we examine decisions to cooperate in economic games. We investigate which payoffs give players the greatest pleasure and whether the pleasure they feel about payoffs predicts their decisions to cooperate. To do this, we modify the ultimatum and dictator games by asking players to consider a fixed set of offers and report their preferences over all offers.