Rents for Pills: Financial incentives and physician behavior.

We study the impact of financial incentives on the prescription behavior of physicians based on a recent reform in two large Swiss cities. The reform opened up an additional income channel for physician by allowing them to earn a markup on drugs they prescribe to their patients. We find that the reform leads to an increase in drug costs by about 4%-5% per patient translating to significantly higher physician earnings.

Regular testing of asymptomatic healthcare workers identifies cost-efficient SARS-CoV-2 preventive measures.

Protecting healthcare professionals is crucial in maintaining a functioning healthcare system. The risk of infection and optimal preventive strategies for healthcare workers during the COVID-19 pandemic remain poorly understood. Here we report the results of a cohort study that included pre- and asymptomatic healthcare workers.

Does Full Insurance Increase the Demand for Health Care?

We estimate the causal impact of having full health insurance on healthcare expenditures. We take advantage of a unique quasi-experimental setup in which deductibles and co-payments were zero in a managed care plan and nonzero in regular insurance, until a policy change forced all individuals with an active plan to cover a minimum amount of their expenses. Using panel data and a nonlinear difference-in-differences strategy, we find a demand elasticity of about -0.

Healthcare Demand in the Presence of Discrete Price Changes.

Deductibles in health insurance generate nonlinear budget sets and dynamic incentives. Using detailed individual health expenditure data from a Swiss health insurer, we estimate the response in healthcare demand to the discrete price increase generated by resetting the deductible at the start of each calendar year. We find that for individuals with high deductibles, healthcare demand drops by 27%.

Nonparametric bounds on the effect of deductibles in health care insurance on doctor visits - Swiss evidence.

We evaluate the effect of the size of deductibles in the basic health insurance in Switzerland on the probability of a doctor visit. We employ nonparametric bounding techniques to minimise statistical assumptions. In order to tighten the bounds we consider two further assumptions: mean independence of an instrument and monotone treatment response.