The participatory dimension of individual responsibility.

Collaborativism is the view that moral reasoning is better when it is socially embedded. We propose that, when people take part in dialogic exchanges, they align in ways that open up novel avenues for sharing values and rationality criteria and, therefore, for exercising responsible agency. The hypothesis that collaborative interactions unfold through the alignment of minds and bodies helps articulate Doris's participatory approach to morality.

Why not the first-person plural in social cognition?

Through the mental alignment that sustains social interactions, the minds of individuals are shared. One interpretation of shared intentionality involves the ability of individuals to perceive features of the action scene from the perspective of the group (the "we-mode"). This first-person plural approach in social cognition is distinct from and preferable to the second-person approach proposed in the target article.

Social cognition in the we-mode.

According to many philosophers and scientists, human sociality is explained by the unique capacity to share the mental states of others. Shared intentionality has been widely debated in the past two decades in ways that also enlighten the current 'interactive turn' in social cognition. In this article, we examine the function and significance for interacting agents of sharing minds in an irreducibly collective mode called the 'we-mode'.