Imagining what might be: why children underestimate uncertainty.

Children's well-documented tendency to behave as if they know more than they do about uncertain events is reduced under two conditions: when the outcome of a chance event has yet to be determined and when one unknown outcome has occurred but is difficult to imagine. In Experiment 1, in line with published findings, 5- and 6-year-olds (N=61) preferred to guess the unknown location of a known object when the object was in place rather than before its location had been determined. There was no such preference when the object's identity was unknown.

Agency affects adults', but not children's, guessing preferences in a game of chance.

Adults and children have recently been shown to prefer guessing the outcome of a die roll after the die has been rolled (but remained out of sight) rather than before it has been rolled. This result is contrary to the predictions of the competence hypothesis (Heath & Tversky, 1991 ), which proposes that people are sensitive to the degree of their relative ignorance and therefore prefer to guess about an outcome it is impossible to know, rather than one that they could know, but do not. We investigated the potential role of agency in guessing preferences about a novel game of chance.

Vividness of visual imagery and social desirable responding: correlations of the vividness of visual imagery questionnaire with the balanced inventory of desirable responding and the Marlowe-Crowne scale.

Correlational research investigating the relationship between scores on self-report imagery questionnaires and measures of social desirable responding has shown only a weak association. However, researchers have argued that this research may have underestimated the size of the relationship because it relied primarily on the Marlowe-Crowne scale (MC; Crowne & Marlowe, Journal of Consulting Psychology, 24, 349-354, 1960), which loads primarily on the least relevant form of social desirable responding for this particular context, the moralistic bias. Here we report the analysis of data correlating the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ; Marks, Journal of Mental Imagery, 19, 153-166, 1973) with the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR; Paulhus, 2002) and the MC scale under anonymous testing conditions.

Withholding and withdrawal of life-sustaining therapies in intensive care: an Australian experience.

Objectives: Withholding and withdrawal of treatment in intensive care is currently widely accepted, but little has been published about Australian practice.

Design And Setting: Retrospective audit of all deaths in two major tertiary intensive care units in the Hunter New England Area Health Service during 2008. Patients who died were classified as "no limitations" (died while receiving full treatment), "treatments withheld" (specific treatment limitations) or "withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment" (WLST).

Children's differentiation between beliefs about matters of fact and matters of opinion.

Two experiments investigated children's implicit and explicit differentiation between beliefs about matters of fact and matters of opinion. In Experiment 1, 8- to 9-year-olds' (n = 88) explicit understanding of the subjectivity of opinions was found to be limited, but their conformity to others' judgments on a matter of opinion was considerably lower than their conformity to others' views regarding an ambiguous fact. In Experiment 2, children aged 6, 8, or 10 years (n = 81) were asked to make judgments either about ambiguous matters of fact or about matters of opinion and then heard an opposing judgment from an expert.

Children's sensitivity to their own relative ignorance: handling of possibilities under epistemic and physical uncertainty.

Children more frequently specified possibilities correctly when uncertainty resided in the physical world (physical uncertainty) than in their own perspective of ignorance (epistemic uncertainty). In Experiment 1 (N=61), 4- to 6-year-olds marked both doors from which a block might emerge when the outcome was undetermined, but a single door when they knew the block was hidden behind one door. In Experiments 2 (N=30; 5- to 6-year-olds) and 3 (N=80; 5- to 8-year-olds), children placed food in both possible locations when an imaginary pet was yet to occupy one, but in a single location when the pet was already hidden in one.