Tit-for-tat or win-stay, lose-shift?

The repeated Prisoner's Dilemma is usually known as a story of tit-for-tat (TFT). This remarkable strategy has won both of Robert Axelrod's tournaments. TFT does whatever the opponent has done in the previous round.

Direct reciprocity on graphs.

Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation based on the idea of repeated encounters between the same two individuals. Here we examine direct reciprocity in structured populations, where individuals occupy the vertices of a graph. The edges denote who interacts with whom.

Breaking the symmetry between interaction and replacement in evolutionary dynamics on graphs.

We study the evolution of cooperation modeled as symmetric 2x2 games in a population whose structure is split into an interaction graph defining who plays with whom and a replacement graph specifying evolutionary competition. We find it is always harder for cooperators to evolve whenever the two graphs do not coincide. In the thermodynamic limit, the dynamics on both graphs is given by a replicator equation with a rescaled payoff matrix in a rescaled time.

Evolutionary graph theory: breaking the symmetry between interaction and replacement.

We study evolutionary dynamics in a population whose structure is given by two graphs: the interaction graph determines who plays with whom in an evolutionary game; the replacement graph specifies the geometry of evolutionary competition and updating. First, we calculate the fixation probabilities of frequency dependent selection between two strategies or phenotypes. We consider three different update mechanisms: birth-death, death-birth and imitation.

Chromodynamics of cooperation in finite populations.

Background: The basic idea of tag-based models for cooperation is that individuals recognize each other via arbitrary signals, so-called tags. If there are tags of different colors, then cooperators can always establish new signals of recognition. The resulting "chromodynamics" is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation.

Pairwise comparison and selection temperature in evolutionary game dynamics.

Recently, the frequency-dependent Moran process has been introduced in order to describe evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations. Here, an alternative to this process is investigated that is based on pairwise comparison between two individuals. We follow a long tradition in the physics community and introduce a temperature (of selection) to account for stochastic effects.

Coevolution of strategy and structure in complex networks with dynamical linking.

We introduce a model in which individuals differ in the rate at which they seek new interactions with others, making rational decisions modeled as general symmetric two-player games. Once a link between two individuals has formed, the productivity of this link is evaluated. Links can be broken off at different rates.

Upstream reciprocity and the evolution of gratitude.

If someone is nice to you, you feel good and may be inclined to be nice to somebody else. This every day experience is borne out by experimental games: the recipients of an act of kindness are more likely to help in turn, even if the person who benefits from their generosity is somebody else. This behaviour, which has been called 'upstream reciprocity', appears to be a misdirected act of gratitude: you help somebody because somebody else has helped you.

Five rules for the evolution of cooperation.

Cooperation is needed for evolution to construct new levels of organization. Genomes, cells, multicellular organisms, social insects, and human society are all based on cooperation. Cooperation means that selfish replicators forgo some of their reproductive potential to help one another.

Digital cows grazing on digital grounds.

Picture a pasture open to all (...

The age incidence of chronic myeloid leukemia can be explained by a one-mutation model.

Chronic myeloid leukemia (CML) is associated with the Philadelphia chromosome, which arises by a reciprocal translocation between chromosomes 9 and 22 and harbors the BCR-ABL fusion oncogene. It is unknown whether any other mutations are needed for the chronic phase of the disease. The CML incidence increases as a function of age with an exponent of approximately 3.

Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations with strong selection and weak mutation.

We study stochastic game dynamics in finite populations. To this end we extend the classical Moran process to incorporate frequency-dependent selection and mutation. For 2 x 2 games, we give a complete analysis of the long-run behavior when mutation rates are small.

Stochastic payoff evaluation increases the temperature of selection.

We study stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in populations of finite size. Moreover, each individual has a randomly distributed number of interactions with other individuals. Therefore, the payoff of two individuals using the same strategy can be different.

Cancer biology: infectious tumour cells.

New evidence is mounting that cancer cells can evolve to become infectious agents and be transmitted between individuals.

Stochastic dynamics of invasion and fixation.

We study evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations. We analyze an evolutionary process, which we call pairwise comparison, for which we adopt the ubiquitous Fermi distribution function from statistical mechanics. The inverse temperature in this process controls the intensity of selection, leading to a unified framework for evolutionary dynamics at all intensities of selection, from random drift to imitation dynamics.

Evolutionary games on cycles.

Traditional evolutionary game theory explores frequency-dependent selection in well-mixed populations without spatial or stochastic effects. But recently there has been much interest in studying the evolutionary game dynamics in spatial settings, on lattices and other graphs. Here, we present an analytic approach for the stochastic evolutionary game dynamics on the simplest possible graph, the cycle.

Active linking in evolutionary games.

In the traditional approach to evolutionary game theory, the individuals of a population meet each other at random, and they have no control over the frequency or duration of interactions. Here we remove these simplifying assumptions. We introduce a new model, where individuals differ in the rate at which they seek new interactions.

A symmetry of fixation times in evoultionary dynamics.

In this paper, we show that for evolutionary dynamics between two types that can be described by a Moran process, the conditional fixation time of either type is the same irrespective of the selective scenario. With frequency dependent selection between two strategies A and B of an evolutionary game, regardless of whether A dominates B, A and B are best replies to themselves, or A and B are best replies to each other, the conditional fixation times of a single A and a single B mutant are identical. This does not hold for Wright-Fisher models, nor when the mutants start from multiple copies.

The replicator equation on graphs.

We study evolutionary games on graphs. Each player is represented by a vertex of the graph. The edges denote who meets whom.

Evolution of cooperation by multilevel selection.

We propose a minimalist stochastic model of multilevel (or group) selection. A population is subdivided into groups. Individuals interact with other members of the group in an evolutionary game that determines their fitness.

A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks.

A fundamental aspect of all biological systems is cooperation. Cooperative interactions are required for many levels of biological organization ranging from single cells to groups of animals. Human society is based to a large extent on mechanisms that promote cooperation.

Evolution of resistance during clonal expansion.

Acquired drug resistance is a major limitation for cancer therapy. Often, one genetic alteration suffices to confer resistance to an otherwise successful therapy. However, little is known about the dynamics of the emergence of resistant tumor cells.

Evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process.

Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations can be described by a frequency dependent, stochastic Wright-Fisher process. We consider a symmetric game between two strategies, A and B. There are discrete generations.

Evolution of resistance to cancer therapy.

Acquired drug resistance is a major limitation for successful treatment of cancer. Resistance emerges due to drug exclusion, drug metabolism and alteration of the drug target by mutation or overexpression. Depending on therapy, the type of cancer and its stage, one or several genetic or epigenetic alterations are necessary to confer resistance to treatment.