Hospice Nurse Ethics and Institutional Policies Toward Medical Aid in Dying.

A significant number of hospices in U.S. jurisdictions where medical aid in dying is legal have implemented policies that require nurses to leave the room when a patient ingests aid-in-dying medication.

Neurologic Diseases and Medical Aid in Dying: Aid-in-Dying Laws Create an Underclass of Patients Based on Disability.

Terminally ill patients in 10 states plus Washington, D.C. have the right to take prescribed medications to end their lives (medical aid in dying).

Ending One's Life in Advance.

If you developed Alzheimer disease, would you want to go all the way to the end of what might be a decade-long course? Some would; some wouldn't. Options open to those who choose to die sooner are often inadequate. Do-not-resuscitate orders and advance directives depend on others' cooperation.

Should Pediatric Euthanasia be Legalized?

Voluntary active euthanasia for adults at their explicit request has been legal in Belgium and the Netherlands since 2002. In those countries, acceptance of the practice for adults has been followed by acceptance of the practice for children. Opponents of euthanasia see this as a dangerous slippery slope.

Continuous sedation until death: moral justifications of physicians and nurses--a content analysis of opinion pieces.

Continuous sedation until death (CSD), the act of reducing or removing the consciousness of an incurably ill patient until death, often provokes medical-ethical discussions in the opinion sections of medical and nursing journals. A content analysis of opinion pieces in medical and nursing literature was conducted to examine how clinicians define and describe CSD, and how they justify this practice morally. Most publications were written by physicians and published in palliative or general medicine journals.

Should rapid tests for HIV infection now be mandatory during pregnancy? Global differences in scarcity and a dilemma of technological advance.

Since testing for HIV infection became possible in 1985, testing of pregnant women has been conducted primarily on a voluntary, 'opt-in' basis. Faden, Geller and Powers, Bayer, Wilfert, and McKenna, among others, have suggested that with the development of more reliable testing and more effective therapy to reduce maternal-fetal transmission, testing should become either routine with 'opt-out' provisions or mandatory. We ask, in the light of the new rapid tests for HIV, such as OraQuick, and the development of antiretroviral treatment that can reduce maternal-fetal transmission rates to <2%, whether that time is now.

How infectious diseases got left out--and what this omission might have meant for bioethics.

In this article, we first document the virtually complete absence of infectious disease examples and concerns at the time bioethics emerged as a field. We then argue that this oversight was not benign by considering two central issues in the field, informed consent and distributive justice, and showing how they might have been framed differently had infectiousness been at the forefront of concern. The solution to this omission might be to apply standard approaches in liberal bioethics, such as autonomy and the harm principle, to infectious examples.