Adverse selection and consumer inertia: empirical evidence from the Dutch health insurance market.

This paper examines to what extent consumer inertia can reduce adverse selection in health insurance markets. To this end, we investigate consumer choice of deductible in the Dutch health insurance market over the period 2013-2018, using panel data based on a large random sample (266 k) of all insured individuals in the Netherlands. The Dutch health insurance market offers a unique setting for studying adverse selection, because during annual open enrollment periods all adults are free to choose an extra deductible up to 500 euro per year.

Steering them softly with a quality label? A case study analysis of a patient channelling strategy without financial incentives.

Steering patients to lower priced and/or higher quality providers can increase the value of a healthcare system. In a managed care setting, health insurers may use financial incentives for this purpose. However, introducing cost-sharing differences among providers may cause enrolee discontent, which may result in disenrollment.

Financing COVID-19-related health care costs in the Dutch competitive health system during 2020 and 2021: Overall experiences and policy recommendations for improving health system resilience.

The Dutch health system is based on the principles of managed (or regulated) competition, meaning that competing risk bearing insurers and providers negotiate contracts on the price, quantity and quality of care. The COVID-19 pandemic caused a huge external shock to the health system which potentially distorted the conditions required for fair competition. Therefore, an important question is to what extent was the competitive Dutch health system resilient to the financial shock caused by the pandemic? Overall, the Dutch competitive health system proved to be sufficiently flexible and resilient at absorbing the financial shock caused by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021 due to an effective combination of regulatory and self-regulatory measures.

Reasons for merging and collaborating in healthcare: Marriage or living apart together?

Background: Across OECD countries, integration between healthcare organisations has become an indispensable part of contemporary healthcare provision. In recent years, inter-organisational collaboration has increasingly been encouraged in health and competition policy at the expense of mergers. Yet, understanding of whether healthcare organisations make an active choice between merging and collaborating is lacking.

Emergency care reconfiguration in the Netherlands: conflicting interests and trade-offs from a multidisciplinary perspective.

Many countries are reconfiguring their emergency care systems to improve quality and efficiency of care, and this often includes the concentration of emergency departments (EDs). This trend is evident in the Netherlands, but the best approach is the subject of debate among stakeholders. We (i) examined the views of stakeholders on the concentration of EDs in the Netherlands and (ii) identified the main conflicting interests and trade-offs that are relevant for health policy.

Health service planning to assess the expected impact of centralising specialist cancer services on travel times, equity, and outcomes: a national population-based modelling study.

Background: Centralisation of specialist cancer services is occurring in many countries, often without evaluating the potential impact before implementation. We developed a health service planning model that can estimate the expected impacts of different centralisation scenarios on travel time, equity in access to services, patient outcomes, and hospital workload, using rectal cancer surgery as an example.

Methods: For this population-based modelling study, we used routinely collected individual patient-level data from the National Cancer Registration and Analysis Service (NCRAS) and linked to the NHS Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) database for 11 888 patients who had been diagnosed with rectal cancer between April 1, 2016, and Dec 31, 2018, and who subsequently underwent a major rectal cancer resection in 163 National Health Service (NHS) hospitals providing rectal cancer surgery in England.

Associations of hospital volume and hospital competition with short-term, middle-term and long-term patient outcomes after breast cancer surgery: a retrospective population-based study.

Objectives: For oncological care, there is a clear tendency towards centralisation and collaboration aimed at improving patient outcomes. However, in market-based healthcare systems, this trend is related to the potential trade-off between hospital volume and hospital competition. We analyse the association between hospital volume, competition from neighbouring hospitals and outcomes for patients who underwent surgery for invasive breast cancer (IBC).

Do health insurers use target marketing as a tool for risk selection? Evidence from the Netherlands.

In health care systems based on managed competition, enrolees can choose between insurers who are positioned as prudent buyers of care on their behalf. To avoid risk selection, insurers are compensated through a system of risk equalisation. The Dutch system of risk equalisation is generally considered to be one of the most sophisticated in the world.

Inter-organizational collaboration between healthcare providers.

Across OECD countries, healthcare organizations increasingly rely on inter-organizational collaboration (IOC). Yet, systematic insight into the relations across different healthcare sectors is lacking. The aim of this explorative study is twofold.

Cooperation amongst insurers on enhancing quality of care: precondition or substitute for competition?

In health care systems based upon managed competition, insurers are expected to negotiate with providers about price and quality of care. The Dutch experience, however, shows that quality plays a limited role in insurer-provider negotiations. It has been suggested that this is partly due to a lack of cooperation among insurers.

Does price deregulation in a competitive hospital market damage quality?

Regulators may be hesitant to permit price competition in healthcare markets because of its potential to damage quality. We assess whether this fear is well founded by examining a reform that permitted Dutch health insurers to freely negotiate prices with hospitals. Unlike previous research on hospital competition that has relied on quality indicators for urgent treatments, we take advantage of a plausible absence of selection bias to identify the effect on the quality of elective procedures that should be more price responsive.

Simulating the impact of centralization of prostate cancer surgery services on travel burden and equity in the English National Health Service: A national population based model for health service re-design.

Introduction: There is limited evidence on the impact of centralization of cancer treatment services on patient travel burden and access to treatment. Using prostate cancer surgery as an example, this national study analysis aims to simulate the effect of different centralization scenarios on the number of center closures, patient travel times, and equity in access.

Methods: We used patient-level data on all men (n = 19,256) undergoing radical prostatectomy in the English National Health Service between January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2014, and considered three scenarios for centralization of prostate cancer surgery services A: procedure volume, B: availability of specialized services, and C: optimization of capacity.

Price effects of a hospital merger: Heterogeneity across health insurers, hospital products, and hospital locations.

In most studies on hospital merger effects, the unit of observation is the merged hospital, whereas the observed price is the weighted average across hospital products and across payers. However, little is known about whether price effects vary between hospital locations, products, and payers. We expand existing bargaining models to allow for heterogeneous price effects and use a difference-in-differences model in which price changes at the merging hospitals are compared with price changes at comparison hospitals.

Patient responsiveness to a differential deductible: empirical results from The Netherlands.

Health insurers may use financial incentives to encourage their enrollees to choose preferred providers for medical treatment. Empirical evidence whether differences in cost-sharing rates across providers affects patient choice behavior is, especially from Europe, limited. This paper examines the effect of a differential deductible to steer patient provider choice in a Dutch regional market for varicose veins treatment.

Managed competition in the Netherlands: Do insurers have incentives to steer on quality?

In health care systems based on managed competition, insurers are expected to negotiate with providers about price, quantity, and quality of care. The Dutch experience shows that this expectation may be justified with regard to price and quantity, but for quality the results are less conclusive. To examine the incentives insurers face for enhancing quality of care, we conducted in-depth interviews with CEOs and organised separate focus groups with purchasers and marketers of five Dutch health insurers.

Competition policy for health care provision in the Netherlands.

In the Netherlands in 2006 a major health care reform was introduced, aimed at reinforcing regulated competition in the health care sector. Health insurers were provided with strong incentives to compete and more room to negotiate and selectively contract with health care providers. Nevertheless, the bargaining position of health insurers vis-à-vis both GPs and hospitals is still relatively weak.

What health plans do people prefer? The trade-off between premium and provider choice.

Within a healthcare system with managed competition, health insurers are expected to act as prudent buyers of care on behalf of their customers. To fulfil this role adequately, understanding consumer preferences for health plan characteristics is of vital importance. Little is known, however, about these preferences and how they vary across consumers.

Hospital merger control in Germany, the Netherlands and England: Experiences and challenges.

Aiming at the efficiency enhancing and quality improving effects of competition, various steps have been undertaken to foster competition in hospital markets. For these mechanisms to work, robust competition policy needs to be enacted and enforced. We compare the hospital markets in Germany, the Netherlands and England regarding their experience with competition and put a special focus on merger control and the stringency of its implementation.

Using the deductible for patient channeling: did preferred providers gain patient volume?

In market-based health care systems, channeling patients to designated preferred providers can increase payer's bargaining clout, other things being equal. In the unique setting of the new Dutch health care system with regulated competition, this paper evaluates the impact of a 1-year natural experiment with patient channeling on providers' market shares. In 2009 a large regional Dutch health insurer designated preferred providers for two different procedures (cataract surgery and varicose veins treatment) and gave its enrollees a positive financial incentive for choosing them.

Patient hospital choice for hip replacement: empirical evidence from the Netherlands.

In the Dutch health care system, hospitals are expected to compete. A necessary condition for competition among hospitals is that patients do not automatically choose the nearest hospital, but are-at least to some extent-sensitive to differences in hospital quality. In this study, an analysis is performed on the underlying features of patient hospital choice in a setting where prices do not matter for patients as a result of health insurance coverage.

Tackling hospital waiting times: the impact of past and current policies in the Netherlands.

This paper reviews the impact of health policies on hospital waiting times in the Netherlands over the last two decades. During the 1990s hospital waiting times increased as a result of the introduction of fixed budgets and capacity constraints for specialists, in addition to the fixed global hospital budgets that were already in place since the 1980s. To tackle these increased waiting times over the years 2000-2011 several policies were implemented, including a change from fixed budgets to activity-based funding--for both hospitals and specialists--and increased competition among hospitals.

Do patients choose hospitals with high quality ratings? Empirical evidence from the market for angioplasty in the Netherlands.

A necessary condition for competition to promote quality in hospital markets is that patients are sensitive to differences in hospital quality. In this paper we examine the relationship between hospital quality, as measured by publicly available quality ratings, and patient hospital choice for angioplasty using individual claims data from a large health insurer. We find that Dutch patients have a high propensity to choose hospitals with a good reputation, both overall and for cardiology, and a low readmission rate after treatment for heart failure.

The impact of geographic market definition on the stringency of hospital merger control in Germany and the Netherlands.

In markets where hospitals are expected to compete, preventive merger control aims to prohibit anticompetitive mergers. In the hospital industry, however, the standard method for defining the relevant market (SSNIP) is difficult to apply and alternative approaches have proven inaccurate. Experiences from the United States show that courts, by identifying overly broad geographic markets, have underestimated the anticompetitive effects of hospital mergers.