Migration costs and rewarding schemes in spatial public goods games.

This study explores the influence of migration costs and rewarding schemes on cooperation through the implementation of computational behavioral models in spatial public goods games. The former involves a cost for agents to migrate to a neighboring group, while the latter rewards them for remaining in the same group for multiple rounds. By analyzing these mechanisms separately and in combination, we unveil their effects on cooperative behavior.

Probiotics and Prebiotics Orally Assumed as Disease Modifiers for Stable Mild Atopic Dermatitis: An Italian Real-Life, Multicenter, Retrospective, Observational Study.

The role of the skin-gut axis in atopic dermatitis (AD) remains a subject of debate, limiting non-pharmacological interventions such as probiotics and prebiotics. To improve understanding of their potential as a monotherapy for stable mild cases, we conducted a real-life, multicenter, retrospective observational study in Italy. We administered three selected bacteria ( BS01, LP14, and LR05) orally to patients with mild atopic dermatitis without a placebo control group, following up for 12 weeks.

A Local Optima Network View of Real Function Fitness Landscapes.

The local optima network model has proved useful in the past in connection with combinatorial optimization problems. Here we examine its extension to the real continuous function domain. Through a sampling process, the model builds a weighted directed graph which captures the function's minima basin structure and its interconnection and which can be easily manipulated with the help of complex networks metrics.

Cooperation on dynamic networks within an uncertain reputation environment.

Reputation plays a key role among the mechanisms supporting cooperation in our society. This is a well-known observation and, in fact, several studies have shown that reputation may substantially increase cooperation among subjects playing Prisoner's Dilemma games in the laboratory. Unfortunately, recent experiments indicate that when reputation can be faked cooperation can still be maintained at the expense of honest subjects who are deceived by the dishonest ones.