Replicator population dynamics of group interactions: Broken symmetry, thresholds for metastability, and macroscopic behavior.

The effect of group structure on cooperative behavior is not well understood. In this paper, we study the dynamics of a public goods game involving n-agent interactions. In the proposed setup, the population is organized into groups.

Rich do not rise early: spatio-temporal patterns in the mobility networks of different socio-economic classes.

We analyse the urban mobility in the cities of Medellín and Manizales (Colombia). Each city is represented by six mobility networks, each one encoding the origin-destination trips performed by a subset of the population corresponding to a particular socio-economic status. The nodes of each network are the different urban locations whereas links account for the existence of a trip between two different areas of the city.

Evolutionary dynamics on interdependent populations.

Although several mechanisms can promote cooperative behavior, there is no general consensus about why cooperation survives when the most profitable action for an individual is to defect, especially when the population is well mixed. Here we show that when a replicator such as evolutionary game dynamics takes place on interdependent networks, cooperative behavior is fixed on the system. Remarkably, we analytically and numerically show that this is even the case for well-mixed populations.

Evolution of cooperation in multiplex networks.

We study evolutionary game dynamics on structured populations in which individuals take part in several layers of networks of interactions simultaneously. This multiplex of interdependent networks accounts for the different kind of social ties each individual has. By coupling the evolutionary dynamics of a Prisoner's Dilemma game in each of the networks, we show that the resilience of cooperative behaviors for extremely large values of the temptation to defect is enhanced by the multiplex structure.

Coevolutionary network approach to cultural dynamics controlled by intolerance.

Starting from Axelrod's model of cultural dissemination, we introduce a rewiring probability, enabling agents to cut the links with their unfriendly neighbors if their cultural similarity is below a tolerance parameter. For low values of tolerance, rewiring promotes the convergence to a frozen monocultural state. However, intermediate tolerance values prevent rewiring once the network is fragmented, resulting in a multicultural society even for values of initial cultural diversity in which the original Axelrod model reaches globalization.

Natural selection of cooperation and degree hierarchy in heterogeneous populations.

One of the current theoretical challenges to the explanatory powers of Evolutionary Theory is the understanding of the observed evolutionary survival of cooperative behavior when selfish actions provide higher fitness (reproductive success). In unstructured populations natural selection drives cooperation to extinction. However, when individuals are allowed to interact only with their neighbors, specified by a graph of social contacts, cooperation-promoting mechanisms (known as lattice reciprocity) offer to cooperation the opportunity of evolutionary survival.