Death-birth adaptive dynamics: modeling trait evolution.

Here, we derive stochastic adaptive dynamics from the microscopic death-birth process by explicitly modeling the trait variation from offspring to parent in each reproductive event, thereby accounting for a highly polymorphic population. This generalization enables the construction of a quantitative model that can be subjected to empirical validation. Our mathematical analysis furnishes a formula for estimating the trait variation in the reproductive step by exclusively observing the current trait variation in the population.

Stochastic evolution of bad memes.

Dawkins introduced a groundbreaking concept suggesting that humans, similar to other animals, operate as gene-propagating machines. Following in his footsteps, Blackmore posits that humans might distinguish themselves from other animals by also serving as specialized meme-replicating machines. Here we introduce a mathematical model that examines the impact of social conformity on the propagation of bad memes (memes with low intrinsic appeal).

When stochasticity leads to cooperation.

The evolution of cooperation has gained more attention after Smith introduced game theory in the study of evolutionary biology. Subsequent works have extensively explained this phenomenon, consistently showing the importance of spatial structure for the evolution of cooperation. Here we analyze the effect of stochasticity on the evolution of cooperation in group-structured populations.

Hidden role of mutations in the evolutionary process.

Mutations not only alter allele frequencies in a genetic pool but may also determine the fate of an evolutionary process. Here we study which allele fixes in a one-step, one-way model including the wild type and two adaptive mutations. We study the effect of the four basic evolutionary mechanisms-genetic drift, natural selection, mutation, and gene flow-on mutant fixation and its kinetics.

Moderate immigration may promote a peak of cooperation among natives.

In a world of hardening borders, nations may deprive themselves of enjoying the benefits of cooperative immigrants. Here we analyze the effect of efficient cooperative immigrants on a population playing public goods games. We considered a population structured on a square lattice with individuals playing public goods games with their neighbors.

Positive interactions may decrease cooperation in social dilemma experiments.

A social dilemma appears in the public goods problem, where the individual has to decide whether to contribute to a common resource. The total contributions to the common pool are increased by a synergy factor and evenly split among the members. The ideal outcome occurs if everyone contributes the maximum amount.

Role-separating ordering in social dilemmas controlled by topological frustration.

''Three is a crowd" is an old proverb that applies as much to social interactions as it does to frustrated configurations in statistical physics models. Accordingly, social relations within a triangle deserve special attention. With this motivation, we explore the impact of topological frustration on the evolutionary dynamics of the snowdrift game on a triangular lattice.

Stochastic win-stay-lose-shift strategy with dynamic aspirations in evolutionary social dilemmas.

In times of plenty expectations rise, just as in times of crisis they fall. This can be mathematically described as a win-stay-lose-shift strategy with dynamic aspiration levels, where individuals aspire to be as wealthy as their average neighbor. Here we investigate this model in the realm of evolutionary social dilemmas on the square lattice and scale-free networks.

Evolutionary mixed games in structured populations: Cooperation and the benefits of heterogeneity.

Evolutionary games on networks traditionally involve the same game at each interaction. Here we depart from this assumption by considering mixed games, where the game played at each interaction is drawn uniformly at random from a set of two different games. While in well-mixed populations the random mixture of the two games is always equivalent to the average single game, in structured populations this is not always the case.

Targeted Cooperative Actions Shape Social Networks.

Individual acts of cooperation give rise to dynamic social networks. Traditionally, models for cooperation in structured populations are based on a separation of individual strategies and of population structure. Individuals adopt a strategy-typically cooperation or defection, which determines their behaviour toward their neighbours as defined by an interaction network.

Cooperation and coauthorship in scientific publishing.

Research collaboration occurs more frequently today than in the past. As a consequence, cooperation and competition are crucial determinants of academic success. In multiauthored publications, not all authors contribute evenly.

Origin and structure of dynamic cooperative networks.

Societies are built on social interactions among individuals. Cooperation represents the simplest form of a social interaction: one individual provides a benefit to another one at a cost to itself. Social networks represent a dynamical abstraction of social interactions in a society.

Distinguishing the opponents promotes cooperation in well-mixed populations.

Cooperation has been widely studied when an individual strategy is adopted against all coplayers. In this context, some extra mechanisms, such as punishment, reward, memory, and network reciprocity must be introduced in order to keep cooperators alive. Here, we adopt a different point of view.