EXPRESS: No evidence for the efficiency of the eye-tracking-based RMET version at detecting differences of mind reading abilities across psychological traits.

The "Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test" (RMET) is one of the most used tests of theory of mind. Its principle is to match an emotion word to the corresponding face image. The performance at this test has been associated with multiple psychological variables including personality, loneliness and empathy.

Cortical Beta Power Reflects the Influence of Pavlovian Cues on Human Decision-Making.

Reward-predictive cues can affect decision-making by enhancing instrumental responses toward the same (specific transfer) or similar (general transfer) rewards. The main theories on cue-guided decision-making consider specific transfer as driven by the activation of previously learned instrumental actions induced by cues sharing the sensory-specific properties of the reward they are associated with. However, to date, such theoretical assumption has never been directly investigated at the neural level.

Associative Visuomotor Learning Using Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation Induces Stimulus-Response Interference.

Classical conditioning states that the systematic co-occurrence of a neutral stimulus with an unconditioned stimulus can cause the neutral stimulus to, over time, evoke the same response as the unconditioned stimulus. On a neural level, Hebbian learning suggests that this type of learning occurs through changes in synaptic plasticity when two neurons are simultaneously active, resulting in increased connectivity between them. Inspired by associative learning theories, we here investigated whether the mere co-activation of visual stimuli and stimulation of the primary motor cortex using TMS would result in stimulus-response associations that can impact future behavior.

The social roots of self development: from a bodily to an intellectual interpersonal dialogue.

In this paper, we propose that interpersonal bodily interactions represent a fertile ground in which the bodily and psychological self is developed, gradually allowing for forms of more abstract and disembodied interactions. We start by focusing on how early infant-caregiver bodily interactions play a crucial role in shaping the boundaries of the self but also in learning to predict others' behavior. We then explore the social function of the sense of touch in the entire life span, highlighting its role in promoting physical and psychological well-being by supporting positive interpersonal exchanges.

Anatomical bases of fast parietal grasp control in humans: A diffusion-MRI tractography study.

The dorso-posterior parietal cortex (DPPC) is a major node of the grasp/manipulation control network. It is assumed to act as an optimal forward estimator that continuously integrates efferent outflows and afferent inflows to modulate the ongoing motor command. In agreement with this view, a recent per-operative study, in humans, identified functional sites within DPPC that: (i) instantly disrupt hand movements when electrically stimulated; (ii) receive short-latency somatosensory afferences from intrinsic hand muscles.

Cerebellar lesions at a young age predict poorer long-term functional recovery.

Early studies on long-term functional recovery after motor and premotor lesions showed better outcomes in younger monkeys than in older monkeys. This finding led to the widespread belief that brain injuries cause less impairment in children than adults. However, this view has limitations and a large body of evidence now indicates that cerebral damages can be more harmful when inflicted at young age, during critical periods of neural development.

Support from a TMS/MEP study for a direct link between positive/negative stimuli and approach/avoidance tendencies.

Previous behavioral studies using stimulus-response compatibility tasks have shown that people are faster to carry out instructed approach/avoidance responses to positive/negative stimuli. This result has been taken as evidence that positive/negative stimulus valence directly activates a tendency to approach/avoid, which in turn, facilitates execution of instructed approach/avoidance behavior. In these studies, however, it cannot be excluded that the results reflect a purely semantic link between stimulus valence and instructed responses.

Defining the neural correlates of spontaneous theory of mind (ToM): An fMRI multi-study investigation.

There is a major debate in the theory of mind (ToM) field, concerning whether spontaneous and explicit ToM are based on the same or two distinct cognitive systems. While extensive research on the neural correlates of explicit ToM has demonstrated involvement of the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), few studies investigated spontaneous ToM, leaving some open questions. Here, we implemented a multi-study approach by pooling data from three fMRI studies to obtain a larger sample to increase power and sensitivity to better define the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying spontaneous ToM.

Reward anticipation changes corticospinal excitability during task preparation depending on response requirements and time pressure.

The preparation of an action is accompanied by transient corticospinal (CS) excitability changes. Motivation can modulate these changes. Specifically, when a cue indicates that a reward can be obtained, CS excitability initially increases, followed by a pronounced decrease.

The role of stimulus-driven versus goal-directed processes in fight and flight tendencies measured with motor evoked potentials induced by Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation.

This study examines two contrasting explanations for early tendencies to fight and flee. According to a stimulus-driven explanation, goal-incompatible stimuli that are easy/difficult to control lead to the tendency to fight/flee. According to a goal-directed explanation, on the other hand, the tendency to fight/flee occurs when the expected utility of fighting/fleeing is the highest.

Measuring spontaneous mentalizing with a ball detection task: putting the attention-check hypothesis by Phillips and colleagues (2015) to the test.

Theory of Mind (ToM) or mentalizing refers to the ability to attribute mental states (such as desires, beliefs or intentions) to oneself or others. ToM has been argued to operate in an explicit and an implicit or a spontaneous way. In their influential paper, Kovács et al.

Anticipating actions and corticospinal excitability: A preregistered motor TMS experiment.

Past research on action observation and imitation suggests that observing a movement activates a corresponding motor representation in the observer. However, recent research suggests that individuals may not only reflexively simulate the observed behavior but also simulate and engage in anticipated action without another person actually engaging in it. For example, it has been demonstrated that observing a triggering event (i.

Brain activity for spontaneous and explicit mentalizing in adults with autism spectrum disorder: An fMRI study.

The socio-communicative difficulties of individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) are hypothesized to be caused by a specific deficit in the ability to represent one's own and others' mental states, referred to as Theory of Mind or mentalizing. However, many individuals with ASD show successful performance on explicit measures of mentalizing, and for this reason, the deficit is thought to be better captured by measures of spontaneous mentalizing. While there is initial behavioral support for this hypothesis, spontaneous mentalizing in ASD has not yet been studied at the neural level.

Spontaneous Theory of Mind is reduced for nonhuman-like agents as compared to human-like agents.

Theory of Mind research has shown that we spontaneously take into account other's beliefs. In the current study, we investigate, with a spontaneous Theory of Mind (ToM) task, if this belief representation also applies to nonhuman-like agents. In a series of three experiments, we show here that we do not spontaneously take into account beliefs of nonhuman-like others, or at least we do it to a lesser extent than for human and human-like agents.

Automatic imitation: A meta-analysis.

Automatic imitation is the finding that movement execution is facilitated by compatible and impeded by incompatible observed movements. In the past 15 years, automatic imitation has been studied to understand the relation between perception and action in social interaction. Although research on this topic started in cognitive science, interest quickly spread to related disciplines such as social psychology, clinical psychology, and neuroscience.

Repetitive TMS of the temporo-parietal junction disrupts participant's expectations in a spontaneous Theory of Mind task.

A recent debate about Theory of Mind (ToM) concerns whether spontaneous and explicit mentalizing are based on the same mechanisms. However, only a few neuroimaging studies have investigated the neural bases of spontaneous ToM, with inconsistent results. The present study had two goals: first, to investigate whether the right Temporo-Parietal Junction (rTPJ) is crucially involved in spontaneous ToM and second, to gain insight into the role of the rTPJ in ToM.

Mimicry and automatic imitation are not correlated.

It is widely known that individuals have a tendency to imitate each other. However, different psychological disciplines assess imitation in different manners. While social psychologists assess mimicry by means of action observation, cognitive psychologists assess automatic imitation with reaction time based measures on a trial-by-trial basis.

Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) reveals a dissociation between SNARC and MARC effects: Implication for the polarity correspondence account.

The concept of stimulus response compatibility (SRC) refers to the existence of a privileged association between a specific stimulus feature and a specific response feature. Two examples of SRC are the Spatial Numerical Association of Response Codes (SNARC) and the Markedness Association of Response Codes (MARC) effects. According to the polarity correspondence principle, these two SRC effects occur because of a match between the most salient dimensions of stimulus and response.

Priming biological motion changes extrapersonal space categorization.

Recent results have shown that the way we categorize space varies as a function of the frame of reference. If the reference frame (RF) is another person vs. an object, the distance is judged as reduced.

Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) of the inferior frontal cortex affects the "social scaling" of extrapersonal space depending on perspective-taking ability.

When we have to judge the distance between another person and an object (social condition), we judge this distance as being smaller compared to judging the distance between two objects (nonsocial condition). It has been suggested that this compression is mediated by the attribution of a motor potential to the reference frame (other person vs. object).

TPJ-M1 interaction in the control of shared representations: New insights from tDCS and TMS combined.

There is extensive evidence that perceived and internally planned actions have a common representational basis: action observation can induce an automatic tendency to imitate others. If perceived and executed action, however, are based on shared representations, the question arises how we can distinguish self-related and other-related representations. It has been suggested that the control of shared representations involves a neural network centered on the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ).

Measuring Mentalizing Ability: A Within-Subject Comparison between an Explicit and Implicit Version of a Ball Detection Task.

The concept of mentalizing has been widely studied, but almost exclusively through tasks with explicit instructions. Recent studies suggest that people also mentalize on a more implicit level. However, to our knowledge, no study to date has directly contrasted the effects of implicit and explicit mentalizing processes on an implicit dependent measure within-subjects.

Brain activation for spontaneous and explicit false belief tasks overlaps: new fMRI evidence on belief processing and violation of expectation.

There is extensive discussion on whether spontaneous and explicit forms of ToM are based on the same cognitive/neural mechanisms or rather reflect qualitatively different processes. For the first time, we analyzed the BOLD signal for false belief processing by directly comparing spontaneous and explicit ToM task versions. In both versions, participants watched videos of a scene including an agent who acquires a true or false belief about the location of an object (belief formation phase).

It wasn't me! Motor activation from irrelevant spatial information in the absence of a response.

Embodied cognition postulates that perceptual and motor processes serve higher-order cognitive faculties like language. A major challenge for embodied cognition concerns the grounding of abstract concepts. Here we zoom in on abstract spatial concepts and ask the question to what extent the sensorimotor system is involved in processing these.