Competition, quality and integrated health care.

Integration of health care services has been promoted in several countries to improve the quality and coordination of care. We investigate the effects of such integration in a model where providers compete on quality to attract patients under regulated prices. We identify countervailing effects of integration on quality of care.

The price of cost-effectiveness thresholds under therapeutic competition in pharmaceutical markets.

Health systems around world are increasingly adopting cost-effectiveness (CE) analysis to inform decisions about access and reimbursement. We study how CE thresholds imposed by a health plan for granting reimbursement affect drug producers' pricing incentives and patients' access to new drugs. Analysing a sequential pricing game between an incumbent drug producer and a potential entrant with a new drug, we show that CE thresholds may have adverse effects for payers and patients.

Paying for pharmaceuticals: uniform pricing versus two-part tariffs.

Two-part pricing (the Netflix model) has recently been proposed instead of uniform pricing for pharmaceuticals. Under two-part pricing the health plan pays a fixed fee for access to a drug at unit prices equal to marginal costs. Despite two-part pricing being socially efficient, we show that the health plan is worse off when the drug producer is a monopolist, as all surplus is extracted.

Hospital competition in a national health service: Evidence from a patient choice reform.

We study the impact of exposing hospitals in a National Health Service (NHS) to non-price competition by exploiting a patient choice reform in Norway in 2001. The reform facilitates a difference-in-difference approach due to plausibly exogenous (geographical) variation in pre-reform market structure. Employing rich, administrative data, covering the universe of hospital admissions from 1998 to 2005, we estimate models with hospital and treatment (DRG) fixed-effects and use only emergency admissions to limit patient selection issues.

Competition and physician behaviour: Does the competitive environment affect the propensity to issue sickness certificates?

Competition among physicians is widespread, but compelling empirical evidence on its impact on service provision is limited, mainly due to endogeneity issues. In this paper we exploit that many GPs, in addition to own practice, work in local emergency centres, where the matching of patients to GPs is random. The same GP is observed both with competition (own practice) and without (emergency centre).

Socio-economic status and physicians' treatment decisions.

This paper studies the relationship between patients' socio-economic status and general practitioners' (GPs') service provision by exploiting administrative patient-level data with information on consultation length, medical tests, and fee payments for each visit in Norway over a 5-year period (2008-2012). To reduce patient heterogeneity, we limit the sample to a given condition, diabetes type II, that is treated almost exclusively in primary care. We estimate GP fixed-effect models and control for a wide set of patient characteristics.

Competition policy for health care provision in Norway.

Competition policy has played a very limited role for health care provision in Norway. The main reason is that Norway has a National Health Service (NHS) with extensive public provision and a wide set of sector-specific regulations that limit the scope for competition. However, the last two decades, several reforms have deregulated health care provision and opened up for provider competition along some dimensions.

Reference pricing with endogenous generic entry.

Reference pricing intends to reduce pharmaceutical expenditures by increasing demand elasticity and stimulating generic competition. We develop a novel model where a brand-name producer competes in prices with several generics producers in a market with brand-biased and brand-neutral consumers. Comparing with coinsurance, we show that reference pricing, contrary to policy makers' intentions, discourages generic entry, as it induces the brand-name producer to price more aggressively.

Patient mobility and health care quality when regions and patients differ in income.

We study the effects of cross-border patient mobility on health care quality and welfare when income varies across and within regions. We use a Salop model with a high-, middle-, and low-income region. In each region, a policy maker chooses health care quality to maximise the utility of its residents when health care costs are financed by general income taxation.

Patient choice, mobility and competition among health care providers.

Policymakers are increasingly designing policies that encourage patient choice and therefore mobility across providers. Since prices are regulated (fixed) in most countries, providers need to compete on quality to attract patients. This chapter reviews the current theoretical and empirical literature on patient choice and quality competition in health markets.

Diffusion of pharmaceuticals: cross-country evidence of anti-TNF drugs.

This article studies the diffusion of biopharmaceuticals across European countries, focusing on anti-TNF drugs, which are used to treat autoimmune diseases (e.g., rheumatism, psoriasis).

Competition and quality in health care markets: a differential-game approach.

We investigate the effect of competition on quality in health care markets with regulated prices taking a differential game approach, in which quality is a stock variable. Using a Hotelling framework, we derive the open-loop solution (health care providers set the optimal investment plan at the initial period) and the feedback closed-loop solution (providers move investments in response to the dynamics of the states). Under the closed-loop solution competition is more intense in the sense that providers observe quality in each period and base their investment on this information.

Reference pricing of pharmaceuticals.

We consider a therapeutic market with potentially three pharmaceutical firms. Two of the firms offer horizontally differentiated brand-name drugs. One of the brand-name drugs is a new treatment under patent protection that will be introduced if the profits are sufficient to cover the entry costs.

Public versus private health care in a national health service.

This paper studies the interaction between public and private health care provision in a National Health Service (NHS), with free public care and costly private care. The health authority decides whether or not to allow private provision and sets the public sector remuneration. The physicians allocate their time (effort) in the public and (if allowed) in the private sector based on the public wage income and the private sector profits.

Gatekeeping in health care.

We study the competitive effects of restricting direct access to secondary care by gatekeeping, focusing on the informational role of general practitioners (GPs). In the secondary care market there are two hospitals choosing quality and specialization. Patients, who are ex ante uninformed, can consult a GP to receive an (imperfect) diagnosis and obtain information about the secondary care market.

Direct to consumer advertising in pharmaceutical markets.

We study effects of direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) in the prescription drug market. There are two pharmaceutical firms providing horizontally differentiated (branded) drugs. Patients differ in their susceptibility to the drugs.

Competition or coordination in hospital markets with unionised labour.

This paper study labour market responses to hospital mergers. The market consists of two hospitals providing horizontally and vertically differentiated services. Hospitals compete either in price and quality or just in quality (non-price competition).