In the shade of a forest status, reputation, and ambiguity in an online microcredit market.

Scholars have long recognized status and reputation as pervasive forces reproducing comparative advantage in social and economic systems. Yet, due in part to methodological challenges, relatively few studies have examined how status and reputation interact. We use data from an online market for peer-to-peer lending to study independent and joint effects of status and reputation on borrowers' success at obtaining loans.

Status Decreases Dominance in the West but Increases Dominance in the East.

In the experiments reported here, we integrated work on hierarchy, culture, and the enforcement of group cooperation by examining patterns of punishment. Studies in Western contexts have shown that having high status can temper acts of dominance, suggesting that high status may decrease punishment by the powerful. We predicted that high status would have the opposite effect in Asian cultures because vertical collectivism permits the use of dominance to reinforce the existing hierarchical order.

Do Reputation Systems Undermine Trust? Divergent Effects of Enforcement Type on Generalized Trust and Trustworthiness.

Research shows that enforcing cooperation using contracts or tangible sanctions can backfire, undermining people's intrinsic motivation to cooperate: when the enforcement is removed, people are less trusting or trustworthy than when there is no enforcement to begin with. The author examines whether reputation systems have similar consequences for generalized trust and trustworthiness. Using a web-based experiment simulating online market transactions (studies 1 and 2), he shows that reputation systems can reinforce generalized trust and trustworthiness, unlike contractual enforcement or relational enforcement based on repeated interactions.

The false enforcement of unpopular norms.

Prevailing theory assumes that people enforce norms in order to pressure others to act in ways that they approve. Yet there are numerous examples of "unpopular norms" in which people compel each other to do things that they privately disapprove. While peer sanctioning suggests a ready explanation for why people conform to unpopular norms, it is harder to understand why they would enforce a norm they privately oppose.

Production of saturated acyl L-ascorbate by immobilized lipase using a continuous stirred tank reactor.

6-O-decanoyl, 6-O-dodecanoyl, or 6-O-tetradecanoyl L-ascorbate was continuously produced at 50 degrees C using a continuous stirred tank reactor (CSTR) with an immobilized lipase, Chirazyme L-2 C2, from Candida antarctica. Acetone was used as the reaction medium. For each saturated acyl L-ascorbate, the productivity of ca.