Do we have (in)compatibilist intuitions? Surveying experimental research.

This article critically examines the experimental philosophy of free will, particularly the interplay between ordinary individuals' compatibilist and incompatibilist intuitions. It explores key insights from research studies that propose "natural compatibilism" and "natural incompatibilism". These studies reveal a complex landscape of folk intuitions, where participants appear to exhibit both types of intuitions.

Who tailors the blanket?

The gap between the Markov blanket and ontological boundaries arises from the former's inability to capture the dynamic process through which biological and cognitive agents actively generate their own boundaries with the environment. Active inference in the free-energy principle (FEP) framework presupposes the existence of a Markov blanket, but it is not a process that actively generates the latter.

Empathy, Altruism, and Group Identification.

This paper investigates the role of group identification in empathic emotion and its behavioral consequences. Our central idea is that group identification is the key to understanding the process in which empathic emotion causes helping behavior. Empathic emotion causes helping behavior because it involves group identification, which motivates helping behavior toward other members.

Explaining delusional beliefs: a hybrid model.

In this paper we present and defend a hybrid theory of the development of delusions that incorporates the central ideas of two influential (yet sometimes bitterly opposing) theoretical approaches to delusions-the two-factor theory and the prediction error theory. After introducing the central ideas of the two-factor theory and the prediction error theory, we describe the motivations for our conciliatory project, explain the theoretical details of the hybrid theory we propose, and answer potential objections to our proposal. According to the hybrid theory we advance, the first factor of a delusion is physically grounded in an abnormal prediction error, and the second factor is physically grounded in the overestimation of the precision of the abnormal prediction error.

Recent Work on the Nature and Development of Delusions.

In this paper we review two debates in the current literature on clinical delusions. One debate is about what delusions are. If delusions are beliefs, why are they described as failing to play the causal roles that characterise beliefs, such as being responsive to evidence and guiding action? The other debate is about how delusions develop.

Delusions as harmful malfunctioning beliefs.

Delusional beliefs are typically pathological. Being pathological is clearly distinguished from being false or being irrational. Anna might falsely believe that his husband is having an affair but it might just be a simple mistake.