Children's everyday moral conversation speaks to the emergence of obligation.

For Tomasello's proposed ontology of the human sense of moral obligation, observations of early moral language may provide useful evidence complementary to that afforded by experimental research. Extant reports of children's everyday moral talk reveal patterns of participation and content that accord with the proposal and hint at extensions addressing individual differences.

Theory of mind: A foundational component of human general intelligence.

To understand the evolution of general intelligence, Burkart et al. endorse a "cultural intelligence approach," which emphasizes the critical importance of social interaction. We argue that theory of mind provides an essential foundation and shared perspective for the efficient ontogenetic transmission of crucial knowledge and skills during human development and, together with language, can account for superior human general intelligence.

Why we assume it's all good: the role of theory of mind in early inherent feature inferences.

Cimpian & Salomon's (C&S's) characterization of a domain-general inherence heuristic, available to young children, underplays the importance of our early interest in and recognition of agency, intentionality, and mental life. A consideration of the centrality of desires, goals, and agency in our earliest reasoning suggests an alternative, perhaps complementary, account of our tendency to be satisfied with the status quo.

Young children's reports of when learning occurred.

This study investigated young children's reports of when learning occurred. A total of 96 4-, 5-, and 6-year-olds were recruited from suburban preschools and elementary schools. The children learned an animal fact and a body movement.

Children's attention to beliefs in interactive persuasion tasks.

Whether and when children can apply their developing understanding of belief to persuasion was examined using interactive puppet tasks. Children selected 1 of 2 arguments to persuade a puppet to do something (e.g.