Unskilled and unaware: second-order judgments increase with miscalibration for low performers.

Overestimation and miscalibration increase with a decrease in performance. This finding has been attributed to a common factor: participants' knowledge and skills about the task performed. Researchers proposed that the same knowledge and skills needed for performing well in a test are also required for accurately evaluating one's performance.

Dunning-Kruger Effect: Intuitive Errors Predict Overconfidence on the Cognitive Reflection Test.

The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is a measure of analytical reasoning that cues an intuitive but incorrect response that must be rejected for successful performance to be attained. The CRT yields two types of errors: Intuitive errors, which are attributed to Type 1 processes; and non-intuitive errors, which result from poor numeracy skills or deficient reasoning. Past research shows that participants who commit the highest numbers of errors on the CRT overestimate their performance the most, whereas those with the lowest error-rates tend to slightly underestimate.

The dark side of dialog.

We agree that the self is constructed through a collaborative dialog. But hostile interlocutors could use various cognitive techniques to hijack the dialog, resulting in beliefs, values, and even selves that are out of line with reality. The implications of this problem are dire, but we suggest that increased metacognitive awareness could help guide this process to a truthful conclusion.

What Makes a Dog Adoptable? An Eye-Tracking Investigation.

Humans readily attribute personality and behavioral traits to dogs, and these attributions influence decisions about adoption. This study focused on how these attributions could be influenced by breed and pose by using pictures of four breeds (Doberman Pinscher, Golden Retriever, pit bull, and Rottweiler) in 4 poses (dog sitting alone, sitting with a human, standing alone, and walking on a leash with a human). Participants rated each picture on friendliness, aggressiveness, and adoptability.

The interplay between uncertainty monitoring and working memory: Can metacognition become automatic?

The uncertainty response has grounded the study of metacognition in nonhuman animals. Recent research has explored the processes supporting uncertainty monitoring in monkeys. It has revealed that uncertainty responding, in contrast to perceptual responding, depends on significant working memory resources.

A Tale of Two Comparative Psychologies: Reply to Commentaries.

Animal metacognition is a growing area in comparative psychology that raises questions about the evolutionary emergence of reflective mind and self-awareness. Theoretical discussions are constructive as this area develops. We thank the editor for arranging this dialogue and the commentators for contributing to it.

Humans and monkeys distinguish between self-generated, opposing, and random actions.

The sense of self-agency results from monitoring the relationship between prior thoughts and action plans, sensorimotor information, and perceived outcomes. It is thought to be an important factor underlying self-recognition and self-awareness. Three experiments investigated the sense of self-agency in humans and rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta).

Animal metacognition: a tale of two comparative psychologies.

A growing literature considers whether animals have capacities that are akin to human metacognition (i.e., humans' capacity to monitor their states of uncertainty and knowing).

The highs and lows of theoretical interpretation in animal-metacognition research.

Humans feel uncertain. They know when they do not know. These feelings and the responses to them ground the research literature on metacognition.

Do actions speak louder than words? A comparative perspective on implicit versus explicit meta-cognition and theory of mind.

Research in non-human animal (hereafter, animal) cognition has found strong evidence that some animal species are capable of meta-cognitively monitoring their mental states. They know when they know and when they do not know. In contrast, animals have generally not shown robust theory of mind (ToM) capabilities.

The experience of agency in sequence production with altered auditory feedback.

When speaking or producing music, people rely in part on auditory feedback - the sounds associated with the performed action. Three experiments investigated the degree to which alterations of auditory feedback (AAF) during music performances influence the experience of agency (i.e.

Self-agency in rhesus monkeys.

Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) have shown the ability to monitor their own mental states, but fail the mirror self-recognition test. In humans, the sense of self-agency is closely related to self-awareness, and results from monitoring the relationship between intentional, sensorimotor and perceptual information. Humans and rhesus monkeys were trained to move a computer icon with a joystick while a distractor icon partially matched their movements.

Beyond stimulus cues and reinforcement signals: a new approach to animal metacognition.

Some metacognition paradigms for nonhuman animals encourage the alternative explanation that animals avoid difficult trials based only on reinforcement history and stimulus aversion. To explore this possibility, we placed humans and monkeys in successive uncertainty-monitoring tasks that were qualitatively different, eliminating many associative cues that might support transfer across tasks. In addition, task transfer occurred under conditions of deferred and rearranged feedback-both species completed blocks of trials followed by summary feedback.

The learning of exclusive-or categories by monkeys (Macaca mulatta) and humans (Homo sapiens).

A central question in categorization research concerns the categories that animals and humans learn naturally and well. Here, the authors examined monkeys' (Macaca mulatta) and humans' (Homo sapiens) learning of the important class of exclusive-or (XOR) categories. Both species exhibited--through a sustained level of ongoing errors--substantial difficulty learning XOR category tasks at 3 stimulus dimensionalities.

Refining the visual-cortical hypothesis in category learning.

Participants produce steep typicality gradients and large prototype-enhancement effects in dot-distortion category tasks, showing that in these tasks to-be-categorized items are compared to a prototypical representation that is the central tendency of the participant's exemplar experience. These prototype-abstraction processes have been ascribed to low-level mechanisms in primary visual cortex. Here we asked whether higher-level mechanisms in visual cortex can also sometimes support prototype abstraction.

Carving nature at its joints using a knife called concepts.

That humans can categorize in different ways does not imply that there are qualitatively distinct underlying natural kinds or that the field of concepts splinters. Rather, it implies that the unitary goal of forming concepts is important enough that it receives redundant expression in cognition. Categorization science focuses on commonalities involved in concept learning.

Rules and resemblance: their changing balance in the category learning of humans (Homo sapiens) and monkeys (Macaca mulatta).

In an early dissociation between intentional and incidental category learning, Kemler Nelson (1984) gave participants a categorization task that could be performed by responding either to a single-dimensional rule or to overall family resemblance. Humans learning intentionally deliberately adopted rule-based strategies; humans learning incidentally adopted family resemblance strategies. The present authors replicated Kemler Nelson's human experiment and found a similar dissociation.

The psychological organization of "uncertainty" responses and "middle" responses: a dissociation in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella).

Some studies of nonhuman animals' metacognitive capacity encourage competing low-level, behavioral descriptions of trial-decline responses by animals in uncertainty-monitoring tasks. To evaluate the force of these behavioral descriptions, the authors presented 6 capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) with 2 density discrimination tasks between sparse and dense stimuli. In one task, difficult trials with stimuli near the middle of the density continuum could be declined through an "uncertainty" response.

The comparative study of metacognition: sharper paradigms, safer inferences.

Results that point to animals' metacognitive capacity bear a heavy burden, given the potential for competing behavioral descriptions. In this article, formal models are used to evaluate the force of these descriptions. One example is that many existing studies have directly rewarded so-called uncertainty responses.

The comparative psychology of same-different judgments by humans (Homo sapiens) and monkeys (Macaca mulatta).

The authors compared the performance of humans and monkeys in a Same-Different task. They evaluated the hypothesis that for humans the Same-Different concept is qualitative, categorical, and rule-based, so that humans distinguish 0-disparity pairs (i.e.