Towards a Futureproof Zoo.

To develop an adequate ethical framework for a futureproof zoo, we have to employ what I would call a 'bifocal' view, in which zoo animals are seen simultaneously as individuals in need of specific care and as members of a species in need of protection. From such a bifocal view, the zoo's policy should aim to strike a fair, morally acceptable balance between its effort to ensure the welfare of individual animals and its obligation to contribute to species conservation. I will argue that the prospects of the zoo to achieve such a balance are promising.

DIY-Bio - economic, epistemological and ethical implications and ambivalences.

Since 2008, we witness the emergence of the Do-It-Yourself Biology movement, a global movement spreading the use of biotechnology beyond traditional academic and industrial institutions and into the lay public. Practitioners include a broad mix of amateurs, enthusiasts, students, and trained scientists. At this moment, the movement counts nearly 50 local groups, mostly in America and Europe, but also increasingly in Asia.

Wild animals in our backyard. A contextual approach to the intrinsic value of animals.

As a reflection on recent debates on the value of wild animals we examine the question of the intrinsic value of wild animals in both natural and man-made surroundings. We examine the concepts being wild and domesticated. In our approach we consider animals as dependent on their environment, whether it is a human or a natural environment.

Ethics in technological culture: a programmatic proposal for a pragmatist approach.

Neither traditional philosophy nor current applied ethics seem able to cope adequately with the highly dynamic character of our modern technological culture. This is because they have insufficient insight into the moral significance of technological artifacts and systems. Here, much can be learned from recent science and technology studies (STS).

Pragmatism as a research program--a reply to Arras.

This paper is a reaction to an article by John Arras published earlier in this journal. In this article Arras argues that "freestanding pragmatism" has little new to offer to bioethics. We respond to some of Arras' arguments and conclude that, although he overstates his case at certain points, his critique is, broadly speaking, correct.