To contribute or not: A goals-based perspective on the effect of industry sales trend and solicitation messages on voluntary contributions to a generic advertising campaign.

Generic advertising campaigns such as "Got Milk?" and "Pork: The Other White Meat" are intended to increase demand for the entire product category rather than demand for a specific brand. This research examines the influence of industry (or product category) sales trend and solicitation messages on voluntary contributions toward such campaigns. Based on the idea that the context in which decisions are made may induce goals, a theoretical framework is developed to suggest that a declining versus an increasing industry sales trend induces different goal orientations.

Role of information asymmetry and situational salience in reducing intergroup bias: the case of ultimatum games.

While majority of the literature documents the preponderance of social identity-related biases in favor of in-group members, this research investigates factors that may attenuate the bias. Examining intergroup bias within the realm of information availability and accessibility, this research highlights malleability of judgments and decisions as a function of social identity in both complete and incomplete information situations in the context of ultimatum games. Study 1 replicates the positive bias toward in-group members even in situations where individuals know that the counterpart is behaving unfairly.

Monopoly money: the effect of payment coupling and form on spending behavior.

This article examines consumer spending as a function of payment mode both when the modes differ in terms of payment coupling (association between purchase decision and actual parting of money) and physical form as well as when the modes differ only in terms of form. Study 1 demonstrates that consumers are willing to spend more when a credit card logo is present versus absent. Study 2 shows that the credit card effect can be attenuated when people estimate their expenses using a decomposition strategy (vs.

The Role of Inferences in Sequential Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information: Some Experimental Evidence.

Two experiments tested a sequential bargaining model with one-sided incomplete information and time discounting. The findings suggest that although the comparative statics of the normative model are somewhat descriptive of the qualitative features of the data, bargainers do not conform to the signaling process that underlies bargaining models with incomplete information. Rather than assess and refine a probabilistic assessment of the private information based on the informed bargainer's behavior, uninformed bargainers infer their opponents' competitiveness.